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HOW TO THINK ABOUT VOTER FRAUD
(AND WHY)
CHAD FLANDERS†
“We underscore that we express no opinion here on the cor-
rect disposition, after full briefing and argument, of the ap-
peals from the District Court’s September 11 order or on the
ultimate resolution of these cases. As we have noted, the facts
in these cases are hotly contested.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, debates over voter fraud reached a new level of intensity,
where scholars, citizens, courts and legislatures all debated how wide-
spread voter fraud was, and to what extent more aggressive prosecu-
tion and new requirements on voting would be necessary to combat
the fraud.  Controversy swarmed around whether the Department of
Justice had too aggressively prosecuted voter fraud, and whether the
report of the Electoral Assistance Commission exaggerated the
amount of scholarly dissensus.2  Legislatures passed laws requiring
photo identification and proof of citizenship in order to vote, and
courts were asked to rule on the constitutionality of these and other
measures designed to limit the amount of voter fraud.3  Seemingly, no
† M.A., Ph.D. University of Chicago, 2004.  J.D. Yale Law School, 2007.  Law
Clerk, Alaska Court System, 2007-08.  I am grateful for the conversations I have had
with Bruce Ackerman, Heather Gerken, Joey Fishkin, David Pozen, and William Baude
throughout the writing of this essay.  They will certainly not agree with all of my conclu-
sions.  I would also like to thank Marlynn Wei for her support.  This essay was written
and accepted for publication prior to the Supreme Court’s acceptance and granting of
the writ of certiorari in Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 128 S Ct. 34, cert. granted 76
U.S.L.W. 3122, 76 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sep. 25, 2007) (No. 07-25).
1. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006) (per curiam).
2. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Missouri Prosecutor Says He Was Pushed to Resign, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2007, at A30 (“In one case, Mr. Graves said, the civil rights division had
wanted him to sue the State of Missouri for what federal officials thought was its failure
to purge voter registration roles of people who had died, changed addresses or left the
state.”); see also Ian Urbina, U.S. Panel is Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at A1 (detailing controversy over report that was said to downplay
scholarly consensus on the low levels of voter fraud); David Nather, Election Board Fac-
ing Votes of No Confidence, CQ WEEKLY, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.cqpolitics.com/2007/
04/from_cq_weekly_election_board.htm (detailing controversy over report that was said
to downplay scholarly consensus on the low levels of voter fraud); Greg Gordon, Cam-
paign Against Alleged Voter Fraud Fuels Political Tempest, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS,
Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.commondreams.org/archivie/2007/04/19/630 (de-
tailing the Bush administration’s campaign against voter fraud).
3. See, e.g., Kristen Mack & Gary Scharrer, Gallegos’ Absence Delays Action on
Voter I.D. Bill, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 19, 2007 (updating efforts of Democratic state
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branch of government has been immune from the debate over voter
fraud and its implications.
In attempt to frame the debate in a more manageable way, sev-
eral election-law scholars called for better empirical data on voter
fraud.  These scholars argue that the best way to resolve the voter
fraud debate and to determine whether new laws are necessary to pre-
vent voter fraud is to know to what extent voter fraud is really a prob-
lem.  Thus, in a leading article on photo identification requirements,
Spencer Overton concluded that policymakers should “place a morato-
rium on photo-identification proposals” until a better understanding
of the extent of voter fraud is known.4  Rick Hasen similarly decried
the “empirical vacuum” in which supporters of new laws designed to
deter voter fraud have been working.5  In a concurring opinion in Pur-
cell v. Gonzalez,6 Justice Stevens struck a similar note when he high-
lighted the importance of the Court’s decision “enhanc[ing] the
likelihood that [debates over the constitutionality of voter identifica-
tion requirements] will be resolved correctly on the basis of historical
facts rather than speculation.”7  Such statements fit within a larger
trend in election law scholarship that urges greater reliance on statis-
tics and study rather than intuition and anecdote.8
senators to block voter identification measure); Andrew Zajac & Tim Jones, More States
Ask Voters to Show ID, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2005, at C6 (discussing voter fraud laws in
Indiana, Arizona, Florida, and Missouri).  Laws have been passed requiring increased
documentation in order to vote or to register to vote in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.  Not all of the laws are currently in force. See
generally PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, THE NEW FACE OF JIM CROW: VOTER SUPPRES-
SION IN AMERICA: HARSH AND BURDENSOME VOTER ID REQUIREMENTS, http://media.pfaw.
org/PDF/Reports/TheNewFaceOfJimCrow.pdf.  For cases involving some of these new
laws, see, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating injunc-
tion against new voting identification and registration requirements in Arizona); Gon-
zalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying injunction against
Arizona voting laws); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated with Ind. Democratic Party
v. Rokita, 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)) (affirming summary judgment against challengers of
voter identification laws); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1360
(N.D. G.A. 2006) (upholding injunction against new photo identification laws).  For a
good overview of the litigation in this area, see Richard L. Hasen, Courts Need to Keep a
Skeptical Eye on New Voter Identification Laws, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Apr. 24,
2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=147.
4. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 681 (2007).
5. Hasen, supra note 3.
6. 127 S. Ct. 5, 7, 8 (2006) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7, 8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Moneyball Approach to Election Reform, ELECTION
LAW @ MORITZ, Oct. 18, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/051
018.php (stressing the need to use statistics and other objective evidence in debates over
election administration); Heather Gerken, New Style of Election Reform Begins to
Emerge, ROLL CALL, Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/4876.htm
(advocating a results oriented approach to evaluating election reforms).
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This move, calling for better studies, may be partly strategic;
there is, in fact, not much solid evidence that voter fraud is a real
problem.9  Nor is there much solid evidence that new photo identifica-
tion laws would deter a substantial portion of voters.10  Calling for
more studies may be part of a strategy to shift the burden of proof to
those who advocate more restrictions on the right to vote.11  Whatever
the motivation, the result has been less attention paid to the norma-
tive aspect of voter fraud (call this the “normative vacuum” in election
law scholarship).  Why exactly is voter fraud bad?  Even if voter fraud
happened only infrequently, would it still be a serious harm and could
this justify attempts to prevent voter fraud?  A similar set of questions
could be asked from the other side of the voter fraud equation, the side
having to do with new restrictions on people’s ability to vote.  Those
who object to additional restrictions (photo identification, etc.) worry
that the restrictions will deter many voters from going to the polls.
However, if the burden on potential voters is slight, is there a problem
in requiring voters to show photo identification before they vote?  Is it
a serious wrong if additional requirements deter some potential voters
from going to the polls?  In sum, is voter deterrence such a serious
harm that even if photo identification laws deter only a few voters, it
should be prohibited?
The pronounced lack of attention to the “normative vacuum” has
potentially significant implications.  Those who worry about voter
fraud on the one hand, and voter deterrence on the other hand, may
disagree not only about statistics, but also about the relative harmful-
ness of each.  Until there is a better understanding of why voter fraud
and voter deterrence are bad, studies about the number of incidences
of each may be informative but may not necessarily be decisive.  Peo-
ple might perceive even a limited amount of fraudulent votes to be
enough to justify new measures to reduce fraud.  Others may see any
9. See, e.g., Eric Rauchway, The Great Voter-Fraud Myth, THE NEW REPUBLIC ON-
LINE, Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/39835.html (suggesting
that allegations of voter fraud are exaggerated).  For a somewhat dated political science
review of the literature, see Fabrice Lehoucq, Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Con-
sequences, 6 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 233 (2003) (stating that “the colorful history of vote
fabrication probably exaggerates its role in determining election outcomes”).
10. See Overton, supra note 4, at 657 (providing “policy-makers need better data
regarding the impact of photo-identification requirements on participation by legitimate
voters”).
11. This, in fact, seems to be one of Overton’s aims. See Overton, supra note 4, at
631(urging the gathering and analysis of evidence to avoid a rush to pass voter identifi-
cation laws); see also SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF
VOTER SUPPRESSION 152 (2006) (“Proponents of antifraud measures such as photo-ID
requirements fail to undertake a serious cost-benefit analysis. . .”); Hasen, supra note 3
(arguing that there is little merit in claims that voter fraud is widespread, and believing
a call for more studies is an effort to shift the burden of proof).
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risk of voter deterrence as enough to prohibit new restrictions on the
right to vote.  Only a discussion about the underlying meaning of vot-
ing and elections can comprehensively answer such questions about
how to address the issues of voter fraud and deterrence.  A proper
voter fraud debate requires discussion of both numbers and norms.
The aim of this Essay is not to deny that more study is necessary
or that more attention should be paid to completed studies.  Rather,
the aim of this Essay is to make explicit as well as refine the norma-
tive theories already present in the voter fraud debate.  Part II of this
essay continues the argument for explicit normative theorizing in the
voter fraud debate.  Voter fraud and voter deterrence are notoriously
difficult to measure, a point Judge Posner hammered home in his deci-
sion in Crawford; therefore, we have reason to believe that good stud-
ies might be hard to come by in the immediate future, if ever.
Normative argument often fills the gaps left by reliable statistics and
often influences how we interpret the available statistics.  Accord-
ingly, there is reason to believe that the debate over statistics will re-
main “hotly contested,” as the Court stated in Purcell, even after
subsequent studies are done.12
Part III identifies possible state interests in preventing voter
fraud.  Why, in other words, might the state want to prevent voter
fraud?  This question is not as easy to answer as it might first appear.
Many of the state interests are structural, such as interests in protect-
ing electoral integrity or preventing vote dilution.  By saying that
these interests are “structural,” I mean to indicate that they are not
easily captured by simply saying that some individual’s rights have
been violated. An increasing emphasis on “structures” of democracy
has been the hallmark of recent election law scholarship.13  Part III
demonstrates that the Supreme Court in Purcell and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board14 are utilizing the language of recent election
law scholars in their emphasis on structural concepts such as integrity
and dilution.  The courts in these opinions are defending a theory of
the structure of democracy and the rights of some groups.  Both opin-
ions, however, are extremely compressed, and Part III is dedicated to
interpreting the two decisions and making explicit the underlying,
normative claims.
12. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 8.
13. See generally, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3rd ed. 2007)
(defending the idea that there is an implicit “law of democracy” in American Constitu-
tional law).
14. 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment against challengers
of voter identification law).
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Part IV examines an alternative normative framework to the one
that is implicitly present in both the Purcell and Crawford decisions.
The alternative framework consists of two major claims.  The first
claim is that from a legitimacy standpoint, low levels of voter fraud
should be treated as indistinguishable from low levels of error in tabu-
lating the final election results—both are noise in the system.  Al-
though some noise is tolerable, too much noise in the system could
alter the results of the election, thus threatening the election’s legiti-
macy.  So, in considering the state’s interest in voter fraud, there may
be a difference in its interest in preventing some fraud (which is not
very great), and its interest in preventing large amounts of fraud
(where the state has a significant interest).
Next, Part IV proposes the idea that the right of participation,
though perhaps only denied to a few when new voter requirements are
put in place, is the most relevant (and serious) harm to analyze in the
voter fraud debate.  By combining this claim and the conclusion of
Part III, Part IV argues that there is an important asymmetry in the
balance between the states’ interests and the voters’ interests in par-
ticipating in elections.  In cases that involve laws aimed at preventing
voter fraud, the balance shifts toward the voters’ interests.  Under-
standing this balance helps us understand the utility of statistics
about voter fraud and voter deterrence—that is, it shows when and
where statistics will be useful.  At the limit, this Essay suggests that
courts might have the tools for evaluating each side’s interests that
can settle the debate even in the absence of reliable statistics on the
amount of voter fraud.  The courts in many cases can settle the voter
fraud debate by basing their decisions largely on norms, in a word,
rather than waiting for numbers.
II. THE UTILITY OF STATISTICS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF NORMS
This Part seeks to defend the idea that it is worth looking at voter
fraud as a normative matter, and not merely as a statistical one, that
is, one where all that remains to be done is to have better studies con-
ducted and to look at the results.  Those who advocate more study are
not committed to denying that the normative dimension is important;
what is worrisome, however, is that as a result of the focus on more
studies the normative dimension is downplayed.  The hope in this Part
is to show that the normative aspect should not be downplayed, be-
cause in addition to its intrinsic interest, the normative aspect is fun-
damental to resolving the voter fraud debate.15  The basic claim is
15. I take it that, independently of any reform effort, the meaning of the right to
vote is an intrinsically interesting question.  Is the right to vote important because of
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that our values regarding the meaning of the right to vote will neces-
sarily influence how we look at statistics in this area.  If we want to
know whether voter fraud is a problem, we not only have to know the
magnitude of voter fraud, but also the nature of the harm.  So, too, we
will have to know how great of a harm it is if some voters are deterred
from voting because of additional voting requirements.  If the harm in
these cases is bad enough, then even a small amount of harm might
justify measures against the harm.  Therefore this Part suggests that
an exclusive focus on the statistical aspect of voter fraud might not
only be unwise, but it may even be counterproductive if it does not
ultimately deal with why voter fraud is bad or how deterring some
people from voting might be a serious wrong.16
A. PROBLEMS OF UNDERMEASUREMENT: VOTER FRAUD
There is one simple and general point to be made about statistics
when it comes to voter fraud (and many other areas besides), and it is
one that affects to what extent statistics will be useful in resolving
debates over the prevalence of voter fraud.  The point is that good sta-
tistics may be hard to come by for some phenomenon (such as voter
fraud), and thus the numbers may not accurately reflect how much of
that phenomenon is occurring.  In some instances we may be justified
in taking measures against the occurrence of something even if we do
not have good numbers, but we suspect that the numbers we do have
are not capturing everything that is out there.  This is perhaps easiest
to see in the much cited fact that there are very few voter fraud prose-
cutions.17  This point was explicitly addressed in the majority opinion
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.18  Furthermore, some
have pointed to the lack of people actually convicted of voter fraud as
evidence that voter fraud is not a major problem.19  But how decisive
what it expresses, of what it does, or something else? See generally Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism about Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1711-13
(1993) (investigating the various meanings of the right to vote).
16. In making this argument, I am in some ways rehearsing the general complaint
against cost-benefit analysis (that it ignores deep questions of value) and applying it to
the context of voter fraud.  For a good, general argument against cost-benefit analysis,
see Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Partic-
ular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. LAW REV. 1197 (1997) (criticizing cost benefit analy-
sis as philosophically obtuse).
17. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 654-55 (2007)
(summarizing reports on the lack of prosecutions of voter fraud).
18. 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consoli-
dated with Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)) (discussing the argu-
ment that “as far as anyone knows, no one in Indiana, and not many people elsewhere,
are known to have been prosecuted for impersonating a registered voter”).
19. See Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated with Ind. Democratic Party,
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is this point?  There are many alternative explanations why there are
few voter fraud prosecutions.  It may be expensive to track down voter
fraud, or it may be simply that local governments have not invested
much time and money into investigating voter fraud.  These facts
make it hard to rely on voter fraud prosecutions as good evidence for
the nonexistence of voter fraud, because it is perfectly compatible with
there being a lot of voter fraud, that is, a lot of unprosecuted voter
fraud.
In fact, Judge Posner’s opinion in Crawford makes this point at
some length, and it is a point which goes to the unreliability of relying
on the number of prosecutions when measuring the state’s interest in
preventing voter fraud.  “[T]he absence of prosecutions,” Posner
writes, “is explained by the endemic underenforcement of minor crimi-
nal laws (minor as they appear to the public and prosecutors, at all
events) and by the extreme difficulty of apprehending a voter imper-
sonator.”20  Posner then goes into a lengthy and somewhat convoluted
explanation of why it would be hard to apprehend a person imperson-
ating another in order to cast an additional vote.  Posner explains that
even if fraud were detected, there are reasons why the police would be
reluctant to step in and make an arrest (i.e. it would cause a commo-
tion).21  Whether Posner’s particular explanations are entirely apt
seems less to the point than the general claim that it may be there are
few cases of voter fraud prosecuted not because there are few cases of
voter fraud, but instead because few voter fraud prosecutions are pur-
sued.  Furthermore, voter fraud prosecutions may not be pursued be-
cause police may not think voter fraud is a big deal, people who
monitor polling booths may be ill equipped to spot fraud, or people
monitoring polling booths may find out about the fraud too late to do
anything about it (Posner’s most plausible scenario).  Posner makes a
closely related point about why there are so few reports of voter fraud.
This “lacuna,” Posner contends, “may reflect nothing more than the
vagaries of journalists’ and other investigators’ choice of scandals to
investigate.”22  Consequently, the statistics may reflect something
other than the number of voter fraud occurrences.
Therefore, we should not mistake Posner’s argument that the
state is justified in taking measures against fraud as relying on clear
128 S. Ct. 34) (No. 06-2218), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/sub
pages/download_file_36780.pdf  (citing lack of concrete evidence on widespread voter
fraud).
20. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953.
21. Id. at 953-54.
22. Id. at 953.
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numbers that there is fraud.23  Although Posner does cite some statis-
tics to this effect (whose significance has been questioned by some), he
is making a broader and different argument.24  He is making an argu-
ment that the state can take measures against voter fraud in spite of
the indeterminacy of the numbers.  He makes, in this instance, a re-
vealing analogy to preventing littering—which I will return to again
in the normative sections of this essay.25  “One response” to voter
fraud, Posner writes, “which has a parallel to littering, another crime
the perpetrators of which are almost impossible to catch, would be to
impose a very severe criminal penalty for voting fraud.  Another, how-
ever, is to take preventative action, as Indiana has done by requiring a
photo ID.”26  In other words, Posner says that the lack of clear num-
bers dictates one of two responses.  The state can either impose a very
high penalty for voter fraud, in an effort to deter those who would
commit fraud (and who would be hard to detect), just as it might im-
pose a very high fine for littering. Or, the state can pass laws such as
the one that Indiana passed, requiring voters show photo identifica-
tion before they can vote.  Again, the state is justified in doing this,
not because it is certain that fraud is a problem, but that the state
suspects fraud, and the state has reason also to suspect that fraud
would be hard to measure.  This is not an argument based directly on
statistics, so the lack of clear proof is not dispositive against it.27
B. PROBLEMS OF UNDERMEASUREMENT: VOTER DETERRENCE
It is interesting, given Posner’s extensive explanation of how the
numbers may be misleading in the case of detecting voter fraud, that
he does not offer the same courtesy to those who claim that new re-
quirements—such as the one Indiana passed—would deter voters who
lacked the appropriate identification.  In fact, Posner is positively
mocking the plaintiffs in the case.  “[T]here is something remarkable,”
Posner comments, “about the plaintiffs considered as a whole.  There
is not a single plaintiff who intends not to vote because of the new
23. See Bob Bauer, Voting Fraud and the Offense of Littering in the Jurisprudence
of Richard Posner, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW, May 3, 2007, available at http://www.
moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/moresoftmoneyhardlaw/updates/voting_rights_act_redis-
tricting_issues.html?AID=989 (rehearsing Posner’s argument).
24. See Richard Hasen, The Extremely Weak Evidence of Voter Fraud in Crawford,
the Indiana Voter ID Case, ELECTION LAW, May 2, 2007, available at http://electionlaw
blog.org/archives/008378.html (challenging the credibility of the statistics that Posner
uses).
25. See infra Part IV. A, B.
26. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953.
27. Bauer is helpful on this point. See generally Bauer, supra note 23 (defending
Posner’s argument in Crawford).
\\server05\productn\C\CRE\41-1\CRE104.txt unknown Seq: 9 24-MAR-08 11:29
2007] VOTER FRAUD 101
law—that is, who would vote were it not for the law.”28  Posner takes
the fact that none of the plaintiffs would be deterred from voting as
good evidence that few people in general would be deterred from vot-
ing if the new Indiana law were passed.  Indeed, Posner proceeds
straight from this consideration of the plaintiffs into a discussion of
the merits.  Because none of the plaintiffs would have been deterred,
the harm of passing the law is slight, that is, not of a sufficient magni-
tude to cause the new law to be subject to strict scrutiny.29  With voter
fraud, lack of clear numbers was sufficient because the state might
suspect that the numbers it had might not indicate the true scope of
the problem.  However, Posner does not extend the same sort of char-
ity to those who allege that voter deterrence might also be a real
problem.
But it is not necessary to conclude that the law would harm few
people based on the fact that there was an absence of deterred voters
from the plaintiff class.30  At worst, the characterization of the plain-
tiff class as injured was a strategic blunder (which, however, did not
prevent the plaintiffs from having standing to challenge the law).31  It
does not speak in any straightforward way as to the amount of voters
who would be deterred from voting, nor should it be taken to be.  This
is Posner’s first problem: he makes a leap from the nature of the plain-
tiff class to an understanding of the harm.  Posner does not see that
there may be good reasons, in general, why it might be hard to mea-
sure the extent of the harm of a law like Indiana’s law requiring photo
identification.
It can be hard to tell, absent a major survey, whether people, in
the absence of the photo identification requirement, would have voted.
There could be many people who are unaware of the identification re-
quirement and do not take the steps to secure proper identification in
time to vote in the election.  Some people may not bring the right iden-
tification to the polls, and thus will simply not be able to vote.  There
may also be some people who are erroneously turned away from the
polls because of a misunderstanding on the part of the poll worker.
The point is that we do not know, and it would be hard to tell, how
large the class of people is who absent the new law would have voted
but do not.  For this reason, we might argue in the same way that
28. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951-52.
29. Id.
30. It is not, however, a total non-sequitur.  Posner might have reasoned that if
anyone would have been able to find deterred voters, it would have been those arguing
against the laws; however, because they did not find any deterred voters, it follows that
there are not many.  I thank Dan Kahan for discussion on this point.
31. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951-52 (granting standing to the Democratic Party of
Indiana).
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Posner argues for the state in his opinion, that we should be very care-
ful in passing any new laws that might burden some people’s exercise
of the right to vote.  Posner seems to be too quick to take the character
of the plaintiff class to signify something deep about the magnitude of
the harm the law caused.  Indeed, we might suspect that his brevity in
this matter reflects, not his concern with getting the numbers right,
but with an underlying value decision he has made about the charac-
ter of the harms involved.  What I have suggested in these past two
sections is that both sides can make at least a superficially convincing
case that the numbers as we have them do not tell the whole story,
and so we (state legislatures, Congress) may have to legislate or not in
light of other factors.
C. HOW NORMS INFLUENCE STATISTICS
The above two sections have offered an argument as to why it
might be hard to find decent voter fraud statistics.  I have only given a
cursory examination of the argument to that effect, but at least we can
see how, intuitively, it may be the case that voter fraud might be hard
to detect, and how it might be difficult to measure the true number of
voters who would be affected by additional voting restrictions.  In this
respect, both sides can argue that even though the statistics may point
to no problem or a minor problem, we might still have good reason to
suspect that the problem is significant.  Of course, these types of argu-
ments are open to the objection that, in fact, we can do more studies
and better studies, and that these studies will get at the real scope of
the problems—and this will then go a long way to settling the voter
fraud debate.32  Thus, the argument in the previous two sections is
not decisive, or at least I have not presented it in a form that would
make it strong enough to rebut the objection that all we really need
are the right studies and the right methods.  The argument in this and
the next section is that even if we did have these additional studies,
this might not lead to any real advance in the debate (unless it were
found that there was no fraud, and there was no risk of anyone being
deterred from voting; however, even in this event, people may say that
we need new laws to avoid the perception of fraud, or that laws would
be bad because of the risk that some people might be deterred).33
Therefore, I argue that the amount of voter fraud or deterrence will be
salient depending on how bad we think fraud or voter deterrence is.
32. This seems to be the burden of Overton’s essay.
33. I discuss the issue of perception in more detail later in the essay. See infra
Part III. C; see also JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS
OUR DEMOCRACY 2 (2004) (“Indeed, the level of suspicion [of fraud] has grown so dra-
matically that it threatens to undermine our political system.”).
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Our underlying value judgments will skew our perception of the prob-
lem.34  Indeed, as I already intimated in my suggestion of Posner’s
bending over backwards defense of the state’s concern for voter fraud,
it may already be that we are much more willing to accept statistical
evidence insofar as it reinforces our already held values.  However,
this is not the main argument I want to make.
To better explain the argument I do want to make, I need briefly
to rehearse Dan Kahan’s recent and powerful argument against risk
assessment made especially against Cass Sunstein, for it is Kahan’s
argument that I will ultimately be using in making my argument
about the importance of normative theorizing in thinking about voter
fraud.35  Sunstein’s claim, developed over the course of many essays
and books, is that people tend to be systematically biased in their per-
ception of the facts.36  People tend simply not to know or to exaggerate
certain risks; in a word, their views about what risks are acceptable
and what risks are not acceptable are distorted.  Sunstein, in response
to this phenomenon, argues that it may be best to let certain expert
decisions replace the ordinary, intuitive and biased opinions of peo-
ple.37  Or, perhaps less paternalistically, we may need to be more ag-
gressive in informing people about the relative risks certain things
pose in order to ensure that people are dealing with correct informa-
tion when they make certain personal or policy choices over others.  To
summarize Sunstein’s point perhaps rather crudely, people sometimes
get carried away by their emotions, which causes them to overesti-
34. Cf.  Overton, supra note 17, at 663 (“Even for those who act in good faith, it
may also be difficult to separate empirical data from normative democratic values in
assessing and managing the risks of voter fraud and the exclusion of legitimate voters
by a photo-identification requirement.”).
35. See Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democ-
racy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV.  1071 (2006) [herein-
after Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy] (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear:
Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005)); see also Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Kahan,
Two Conceptions of Emotion]. For Sunstein’s reply, I will be relying especially on Cass
R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110 (2006) (reply to Kahan et al.,
Fear of Democracy, supra).
36. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON] (making the case for “rational risk analysis”); CASS R. SUSTEIN, LAWS
OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) [hereinafter SUSTEIN, LAWS OF
FEAR] (making the case for “rational risk analysis”).  Kristin Shrader-Frechette has
written a valuable review of SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra, to which I am in-
debted. See Kristin Shrader-Freechette, Risk and Reason, NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEWS, Apr. 9, 2003, http://ndpr.nd/edu/review.cfm?id=1252 (philosophical critique of
Sunstein’s program).
37. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 36, at 7 (2002) (“Because I will place a
high premium on technical expertise and sound science, this book is, in many ways, a
plea for a large role for technocrats in the process of reducing risks.”).
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mate some dangers while underestimating others.38  The remedy to
this, at least for starters, is more and better studies, as well as appli-
cation of the good studies we do have so that people can be better in-
formed or (at the limit) be protected from their errant emotional
reasoning.  Sunstein’s work, as may be obvious, finds an echo in the
recent wave of voter scholarship.  People supporting more studies
claim that too much of the debate is being done in the dark, and by
anecdote.  If this is the case, it is no surprise that much of the debate
is emotional and acrimonious.  We need more facts, which will help
calm the debate and possibly even settle it.
One strand of Kahan’s rebuttal to Sunstein takes the following
form: Risk perception is a function of two things and not one thing.39
Sunstein focuses on responses to the magnitude of something happen-
ing, say, the risk of catching HIV from an infected needle, or the risk
of being the victim of gun violence. However, Kahan argues there is
another aspect to assessing risk and that is how bad the harm is per-
ceived to be.40  If the harm is perceived to be exceedingly bad, then
even a low risk of that harm may mean that you are justified in taking
measures to prevent it from happening.  What Kahan has done, more-
over, is to meticulously show that how people perceive risk is corre-
lated with their values.  In other words, people with different values
will put a premium on avoiding certain things, and they will perceive
the riskiness of certain activities through the prism of their values.41
Now, contra Sunstein, Kahan says that this way of perceiving risk
“through values” is not a distortion, and is in fact very far from a dis-
tortion.  Rather, Kahan believes it gets at the very meaningfulness of
those risks in people’s lives.  People value certain things, and people
will shape their lives, including what risks they are willing to take, in
response to their values.  Thus, Kahan does not say that the emotions
are distorting perception; rather, he says that those emotions are per-
ceptions of value.  For Kahan, Sunstein’s examples of skewed risk per-
ception are not “blunders,” but rather examples of expressively
rational stances towards the world.42
38. Id. at 1110 (“As a result of various forms of bounding rationality, human beings
are prone to what might be called ‘misfearing’: they fear things that are not dangerous,
and they do not fear things that impose serious risks.”) (citation omitted).
39. I greatly oversimplify Kahan’s argument here.
40. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 35, at 1083 (reviewing SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 36) (“Individuals selectively credit and dismiss factual claims
in a manner that supports their preferred vision of the good society.”).
41. Id. at 1083.
42. See Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion, supra note 35 (“The cultural evalu-
ator theory views emotions as enabling individuals to perceive what stance toward risks
coheres with their values.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Cass Sun-
stein, (Sept. 10, 2005), http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/blog/2005/09/secret-
ambition-of-cass-sunstein.html (“The cultural evaluator model shows that political dis-
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If we look at cost benefit analysis Kahan’s way, then a certain
way of framing debates that seem to be about statistics comes into
view.  What Sunstein assumes, according to Kahan, is that people in
general will share values—if this is the case, then numbers will be
decisive because people all agree on what risks are bad and are to be
avoided.  If we all agreed, then we should (if we are rational) adjust
our lives to fit what the statistics disclose.  However, if Kahan is right,
many debates over numbers are in fact debates over values.43  People
will differ as to how bad they perceive a certain harm to be, and thus,
will assess the risks accordingly.  If according to our values, the harm
is perceived to be extremely bad then statistics that say that there is a
small risk of that harm will not move us; we still have to decide
whether we still want to avoid the chance of the risk, however small.
Thus, Kahan is claiming that many debates over statistics are really
debates over values, covertly carried out.  Worse, these are ineffective
debates over values because the sides may be assuming that they both
share values, and once the statistics are found then an agreement
about what to do can be reached.  Therefore, we may perhaps be better
off starting with the normative debate.44  This way, we will know
what work the statistics are supposed to be doing, rather than expect-
ing them to do work but finding out—because of an underlying disa-
greement in values—that they will not do this work.
D. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED TO VOTER FRAUD
Kahan’s point, distilled to its core, is an elaborately detailed and
empirically supported version of the familiar claim that risk aversion
will be a function both of prevalence of the thing-to-be-avoided plus an
putes about risk, as data-centered and technical as they tend to be, are really best un-
derstood as conflicts over culturally partisan visions of the best society.”).
43. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 35, at 1105 (“When expert regula-
tors reject as irrational public assessments of the risks associated with putatively dan-
gers activities . . . they are in fact overriding public values.  For just as citizens’
perceptions of the benefits of these activities express their worldviews, so too do their
perceptions of the risks they pose.”) (emphasis added). See also Shrader-Frechette,
supra note 36 (“Yet as many quantitative sociologists and psychologists (Riley Dunlap,
Gene Rosa, Paul Slovic) have shown, the views diverge not because of differences over
probabilities, even though laypeople often get their probabilities wrong. Rather, evalua-
tions diverge because frequently the public does not trust government risk estimates;
does not believe a risk is ‘worth’ the benefit; claims a risk imposition is unfair; or does
not enjoy rights to full compensation for industry-imposed risks (as in the case of the
government-mandated liability limit that excludes citizens’ claims for 98 percent of
worst-case nuclear-accident losses).”).
44. In another article, Kahan argued that this in many cases might not be prudent,
and that in fact debates over numbers are a way of deflecting deeper normative dis-
agreements. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV.
413 (1999) (arguing debates over “deterrence” mask deeper moral disagreements).
However, I do not think an argument of this type applies in the case of voter fraud.
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assessment of how bad that thing is.  If people differ about how bad a
thing is then they will disagree at which point something becomes so
prevalent that it is worth doing something about.  Kahan’s real contri-
bution is to provide data that shows that aversion to certain risks is
reliably correlated to certain values.45  He has not (yet) done a study
involving perceptions of voter fraud, but we might hazard a guess at
what the data might reveal.  Those who are worried about the integ-
rity of an election—or even the perception that an election may lack
integrity—will tend to see even a low risk of fraud as a very serious
harm.  In addition, those who see fraud as potentially disenfranchis-
ing legitimate voters (either by canceling or diluting legitimate votes)
may see even one instance of fraud as a very serious harm.  By con-
trast, those who are worried about electoral participation may see al-
lowing some instances of fraud as possibly worth it—if it means that
overall participation will be increased.  Those of this persuasion will
also see laws designed to make it harder for some people to vote as a
very serious harm: this, rather than fraudulent voting, will appear to
be something we would want to take steps to avoid happening.  So if
there is a risk that a photo identification law would mean that some
people will not vote, they will see this as a very bad thing even if the
numbers are hard to get, and even if the real amount of deterred vot-
ing is rather small.  Under Kahan’s analysis, we can say that how
each side perceives the values at stake will affect how they perceive
the risks in new laws or in fraud—and how much they are willing to
sacrifice to prevent those risks.  On the one side, those who are wor-
ried about the integrity of elections and avoiding the dilution of legiti-
mate votes will want to take strong measures to deter fraud.  On the
other side, those worried about voter participation will see new laws
as unnecessary and too burdensome if the laws risk deterring voters
from voting. If Kahan is right, these value choices will probably re-
main stable, even in the face of more and better studies.
We can already see how Kahan’s point might be true in the case of
Posner’s opinion.  As we saw, Posner spent much more time defending
the state’s assumption that even in the absence of solid numbers, the
state could infer the existence of fraud (given that fraud was difficult
to detect, etc.).  By contrast, Posner spent hardly any time crediting
the plaintiffs’ assumption that voters would be deterred from voting
by the new laws.  Perhaps—in a Kahanian vein—we can attribute this
to the fact that Posner tends to give deterring voter fraud a greater
value.  Revealingly, Posner admits to finding the value of the vote it-
self to be “elusive,” which suggests that the fact that some people
45. See Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion, supra note 35 (further studies sup-
porting Kahan’s analysis of emotion and value in debates over risk).
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might be deterred from voting is less important than the value of se-
curing the integrity of the election results.46  Even more revealingly,
and this is something we will discuss more in Part IV, Posner writes of
those who willingly “disfranchise themselves” by choosing not to get
photo identification in time to vote.47  This suggests that Posner views
the burden on prospective voters as slight—even vanishingly small, so
that to not bother to get identification is not to be prevented or de-
terred from voting, but to positively disenfranchise oneself.  Both of
these things (the characterization of the benefit of the right to vote as
“elusive” and the suggestion that voters who are deterred from voting
by identification requirements “disenfranchise” themselves) contain
implicit or explicit normative judgments.  They have to be assessed as
such.  My point now only is that it is possible, without too much effort,
to see these normative judgments as framing Posner’s consideration of
the statistics, and to what lengths he is willing to go to explain or to
explain away some statistics and not others.48
This normative framing of statistics is evident not only in Pos-
ner’s opinion (which roughly tracks the intuitions of those on the
“right” side of the voter fraud debate), but also in essays and articles
by those who worry about the effects of new restrictions on voting,
such as photo identification.  Spencer Overton, for example, before he
introduces his argument “toward better data on legitimate voters ex-
cluded by photo identification,” spends several paragraphs indicating
the importance of “widespread participation.”49  He does not spend
any similar amount of time delineating the values of avoiding fraud
(integrity, anti-corruption, etc.) before his discussion of methods to
measure voter fraud.  Similar to how Posner frames the significance of
voters who do not vote because of new requirements as involving vol-
untary disenfranchisement, Overton goes out of his way to frame the
significance of deterring voters as presenting a potential harm to the
value of widespread democratic participation.  Overton, in assessing
the statistics (and arguing for better statistical methods) for those de-
terred from voting, sets a different baseline than Posner.  This base-
line is dictated by the importance each puts on avoiding fraud, on the
one hand, and ensuring widespread participation on the other.  Posner
and Overton may be looking at the same statistics, but how they
46. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.
47. Id. at 952.
48. Cf. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 35, at 1083 (stating “culture is
cognitively prior to facts in the sense that cultural values shape what individuals believe
the consequences of such policies to be.  Individuals selectively credit and dismiss fac-
tual claims in a manner that supports their preferred vision of the good society”).
49. Overton, supra note 17, at 657 (claiming “[w]idespread participation serves
four functions.”).
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frame the statistics dictates the relative weight they give to those sta-
tistics.  For Posner, deterred voters represent some voters who chose
to voluntarily disenfranchise themselves.  For Overton, deterred vot-
ers represent a risk to the value of widespread democratic participa-
tion.  Though Posner and Overton may end up agreeing on the
numbers, they will certainly disagree on what the numbers mean.
Normative argument seems to be unavoidable in voter fraud de-
bates, and it may even be decisive in resolving the debate over voter
fraud and measures to prevent fraud.  Our deepest values will dictate
how we perceive the statistics, what we take the statistics to be show-
ing, and ultimately what measures we think are worth taking to pre-
vent the harms.  Of course, it may be possible that good study will
show that there is no fraud, or that there is no real deterrence caused
by new requirements.  This seems very unlikely, but even still (as I
stated above), there may be debate about the perception of fraud or
the likelihood of future deterrence.  Even here, in the limiting case,
statistics might not be decisive.  And we should also acknowledge, as I
argued at the beginning of this section, that good statistics, for a vari-
ety of reasons, will be hard to come by.  Thus, I have in fact been
presenting a weaker and a stronger thesis in this Part.  The weaker
thesis is that in the absence of good numbers (and perhaps even good
reason to think that correct numbers will be difficult to discern) nor-
mative argument will take priority in debates about voter fraud; a pri-
ority that sometimes focusing on the need for more and better studies
will obscure.  The stronger thesis, which I have pressed in the latter
half of this Part, is that even with good numbers, our values will still
structure how we perceive the salience of those numbers.  Thus, the
stronger thesis says not only that normative arguments will take a
certain priority, but that at the end of the day they are probably doing
most of the work in the debate anyway because our values will to an
extent (and not irrationally) be resistant to changes in the numbers.
Therefore, the only real progress in the voter fraud debate will come
from a focus on the values each side holds.  It is to an examination of
those values that I now turn.
III. VOTER FRAUD AND THE “LAW OF DEMOCRACY”
In this Part and Part IV, I leave the debate over statistics—again,
the prevalent mode of talking about voter fraud and voter deter-
rence—largely behind, and I speak solely in terms of norms.  Why is
voter fraud bad, if it is?  When is it bad?  Why is deterring voters from
voting bad, if it is?  When is it bad?  These are the type of questions
that, either explicitly or implicitly as I argued in the previous Part,
drive much of the debate over voter fraud.  It is also in terms of these
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values that the courts make their decisions.  It is therefore of immense
practical importance that we understand the values that the courts
say are at stake when deciding the constitutionality of new laws re-
quiring photo identification at polling places, for instance, or showing
proof of citizenship to register to vote.  In this Part, I give a mostly
sympathetic reconstruction of the arguments various courts, in partic-
ular the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have made in the course of deciding
voter fraud cases.  What is interesting about these cases is how they
intersect with scholarship on what has been called, over the past few
years, “the law of democracy.”50  The claim in this field is that the
Supreme Court (and other courts derivatively) in deciding election law
cases has a certain theory about what democracy is and what it should
be.51  This theory then drives, consciously or unconsciously, the
Court’s decisions.  Importantly, say these scholars, the theory works
far above the level of simply securing the individual’s right to cast a
vote.  Rather, the Court makes decisions on the level of the “structure”
of democracy, and at the level of individual votes taken together in the
aggregate.52
What I hope to show in this Part is that the Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit are speaking the language of these scholars in the
law of democracy.  The courts are, I think, defending a theory of the
structure of democracy and talking in terms broader than simply the
individual’s right to vote.  Of course, the courts do not speak in these
terms at length; therefore, we have to reconstruct many of the courts’
arguments.  But this, perhaps, is the case for law generally.  Courts do
not always make their theoretical assumptions explicit, and it is left to
the task of commentators to do this work: to make the reasoning of
judges present to themselves, as it were, and to tease out the larger
implications of the judges’ positions.  So this is what I propose to do in
this Part, to show that we can understand the several recent court
decisions largely in the terms that the “law of democracy” scholars
have given us.  The irony is that, although the courts I discuss in this
Part reason in these terms, they have been roundly criticized for doing
50. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3rd ed. 2007) (leading
casebook on election law as a unified field of study).
51. It is an open question in the field regarding what is meant by “theory” here,
and one that deserves extended discussion.
52. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (providing a classic de-
fense of the structural approach to election law).  On the dominance of theories of aggre-
gation in voting rights scholarship, see Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of
Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361 (2007) (“Modern voting rights scholarship agrees on
one thing: voting rights are aggregate rights.”).
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so by those who have done the most to defend and articulate the idea
of the “law of democracy.”  This is perhaps ironic, because the terms
the courts use are partly of these scholars own making; the scholars
may indeed be in some sense responsible for the courts making a
structural turn in their reasoning.  So in assessing the courts’ argu-
ments, we will have to see precisely where the courts go wrong:
whether it is in making this structural turn, or whether it is in mak-
ing bad structural arguments.  This is a task I take up in Part IV.  I
begin this Part with a very brief review of the recent structural em-
phasis in election law scholarship, both to see (in this Part) how recent
courts have embraced this trend, and also (in the Part IV) to see how
courts might be in error in speaking and analyzing the harm of voter
fraud in these terms.
A. ELECTORAL INTEGRITY
To see how structural concerns came to dominate the study of
election law, consider first taking a narrow view of what election law
covers.  Let us say, for instance, that it only covered the ability to cast
a ballot in an election.  Now, this is no small thing in itself, and much
of the history of election law can be seen in this light.53  Certainly,
granting former slaves the right to vote is a critical part of election law
history, as was the Nineteenth Amendment which granted women the
right to vote.54  In the Twentieth Century, the right to participate in
elections was further extended by granting those who were twenty-
one years old the right to vote.55 Additionally in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, previously supposed gains were re-established by the Voting
Rights Act, which sought to remove barriers that prevented African-
Americans from voting.56  So again, the right to cast a ballot, which
we might also call the right to participate in an election, is no small
right.  It is a right, as the late Harvard professor Judith Shklar has
argued at length, to be counted a full citizen of America.57  But it is at
the same time a formal right; it is not a right to any share in power.
You may vote and your vote may be counted, but you may be in a
permanent minority.  Worse, there may be no candidates that are
53. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-104
(1998); see also Part III. D.
54. U.S. CONST. amend XV, amend XVIV; Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nine-
teenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947
(2002) (putting passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in larger historical and norma-
tive context).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
56. For a reading that emphasizes this aspect of the Civil Rights movement, see
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOT-
ING RIGHTS (1987) (discussing the controversial history of the Voting Rights Act).
57. See SHKLAR, supra note 53 (emphasizing the participatory aspect of voting).
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even remotely appealing and who might secure your interests.  Or the
system at other levels may be corrupt.  For all of its importance, the
right to participate is limited.  It is a way through the door, but there
may be many other obstacles that can prevent you from getting much
further past the door.
Moreover, a focus on the individual’s right to participate will tend
to obscure the structural issues that are at play in any given elec-
tion.58  To expand upon one of the examples in the previous para-
graph, there may be obstacles that make it harder for third parties to
field a candidate.  For instance, they may have problems getting a
candidate on the ballot.59  We can imagine that everyone who wants to
participate and is eligible to participate does participate in an elec-
tion.  Still, because of structural factors, those people who vote may
feel that their vote does not matter, or does not matter as much be-
cause of the dominance of the two major political parties.  The focus on
electoral structure brings out the aspects of election which tend to be
lost when we look simply at elections as involving the individual’s
right to vote.  Election law scholars say we have to look past the abil-
ity to cast a vote and instead look to the value of casting a vote.  It is
one thing to have the right to vote; it is another thing to have that
right to vote be meaningful or effective.  The focus on structure shifts
the debate to this second level.  Once we have the right to vote, how do
we make that vote mean something?  How can we make sure that
there are candidates who respond to voters’ interests?  How can we
avoid the entrenchment of the two major political parties at the ex-
pense of other voices in the process?60
Or consider another structural factor which occurs in the context
of campaign finance.  Again, suppose everyone has the right to vote.
Still, there will be disparities—as there manifestly are in our sys-
tem—about who can really influence the process by donating money to
candidates.  Therefore, although we may equally have a vote, some
may have more influence than others, both in terms of which candi-
dates are able to run (because they are well-funded), as well as in
terms of setting candidates’ agendas.  Those candidates that win will
feel obligated to govern in accordance with their donors’ interests if
the candidates want to receive funding from these donors in the fu-
58. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1993) (noting emphasis on formal aspect of voting ignores other
meanings of the right to vote).
59. See Chad Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day
from the Perspective of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 147 (2007) (discussing the barriers
to third party access to the political process).
60. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Polit-
ics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004) (explaining partisan entrenchment).
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ture.  This has led to a focus—both in the Supreme Court’s case law
and in scholarly literature—on “corruption” or the “appearance of cor-
ruption.”61  But what exactly is corruption?  Perhaps most intuitively,
corruption might be bad because it involves buying influence.  But
some have argued that it might be corruption simply to have such vast
disparities in electoral power.62  This might be bad in itself, and it also
might be bad because it gives the appearance that elections are a mat-
ter of money and not of voting power.  As Justice Breyer put it, this
would be harmful to “the integrity of the electoral process.”63  In tell-
ing us what corruption is and why it is bad, the court can move to
another level of theorizing—theorizing that takes it beyond merely se-
curing the individual’s right to vote and onto speculation about what
would be a good system of democracy.  Would it be one that simply
prevented quid pro quo campaign donations?  Would it be one that
even prevented the appearance of buying influence?  Would it, at the
furthest level, demand certain equality in the financial influence vot-
ers could exercise over candidates?  All of these questions, I think, im-
plicate questions of democratic structure and not merely the
individual’s right to vote.  Or better, they move beyond the formal as-
pect of the right to vote, and ask instead, in what sort of system will
each individual voter’s vote be made meaningful and effective?
B. VOTE DILUTION
If there is one master concept that best exemplifies the shift in
focus from an individual’s right to participate (his right to cast a bal-
lot) to the individual’s right to a meaningful vote (that is, his right to
influence the political process) it is the concept of vote dilution. The
theory of vote dilution begins with the premise that, for all of its sym-
bolic value, the individual’s right to cast a ballot is empty by itself: it is
just one vote among many.  A vote gets its real value by being aggre-
gated with other votes because it is only in combination with other
voters that an individual voter can actually elect a candidate (it is the
very rare instance where one vote tips the election).64  When we look
at the value of the right to vote, its value is not simply an individual
participatory one, but is also an aggregative one: it gets its value not
61. See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe
for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court campaign
finance decisions and their use of the idea of “corruption”).
62. Id. at 1036.
63. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J.
concurring).
64. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1677 (2001) (“The notion of dilution . . . hinges on the assumption
that like-minded voters should have a fair chance to coalesce—that is, that an individ-
ual’s ability to aggregate her vote with others matters in a representative democracy.”).
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in the solitary act of an individual at the polling place, but in commu-
nity with other like-minded voters.  It is only in this latter way that
the vote (according to these scholars) actually means something, be-
cause it is only in this way that the vote translates into political power
and influence.65  It follows that the value of the right to vote can be
taken from people not only by barring them from casting a vote, but
from arranging voters in a way in which they are prevented from ag-
gregating their votes.  And it is here that we get to the structural as-
pect of the aggregative aspect of the right to vote.  By putting voters in
a certain districting scheme, we can prevent them from aggregating
their votes to elect candidates that represent their interests.  In other
words, we can dilute the voting power of a group by splitting that
group up and putting the members of the group into separate voting
districts.
It was the seminal cases of Reynolds v. Sims66 and then Baker v.
Carr67 that brought the concept of vote dilution to the fore in election
law.  Both cases involved the practice of having unequal numbers of
voters in different districts.  An urban district, for instance, might
have many more thousands of voters in it than a comparatively (geo-
graphically) sized rural district.  The result of this disparity was that
voters in rural districts got more bang for their individual votes—each
of their individual votes meant more, as the individual vote of the ru-
ral voter was able to exercise a greater influence than the individual
vote of the urban voter.  After being warned of heading into a “political
thicket,” the Supreme Court eventually found that such disparities in
voting power violated the Fourteenth Amendment.68  Instead of dis-
tricts that had differently sized voting populations, the Court said
that districts from now on had to have equal populations.  Specifically,
this meant that an urban voter could not have less influence on the
political process than a similarly situated voter in a rural district.69
All votes had to be of equal weight.  Now, it is important to see that
although the decision can be cast in terms that make it sound as if the
individual’s right to vote is merely being vindicated, the reality is in
65. See id. at 1677 (noting the importance of the “aggregative” aspect of the right to
vote); see also Karlan, supra note 58, at 1705 (noting the importance of the “aggregative”
aspect of the right to vote); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMEN-
TAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (especially examine Chapter 4
stressing the importance of having a “reasonable chance at representation” and how
some election schemes fail to secure this).
66. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
68. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“We are cautioned about the dan-
gers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires.”).
69. Id. at 567 (“To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate
reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.”).
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fact more complex.  Prior to Reynolds, the original districting scheme
prevented urban voters from exercising the same impact as rural vot-
ers.  Their “group,” even though it might have greater numbers than
the rural “group,” would end up having the same influence: they could
only elect one candidate for their district.70  The redistricting deci-
sions allowed urban voters, as a group, to have the same power as
rural voters.  In the end, the Reynolds line of cases was about the
power of a certain group (in this case urban voters) to aggregate their
votes more effectively, or as effectively as rural voters.
This point—the point that the original redistricting decisions
were not about individual rights simpliciter, but about the rights of
individuals to aggregate their votes effectively in a group—is easier to
see in another major area where redistricting plays a huge role: racial
redistricting under the Voting Rights Act.71  Here we have perhaps
the best example of votes having been made less meaningful because
of the effects of certain structural factors.  In response to the passage
of the Voting Rights Act, white legislators began to draw district lines
in such a way as to minimize the ability of blacks to come together and
elect their favored candidates.72  Blacks were either spread out across
districts making them a minority in many districts, or blacks were all
packed into one district so that white majorities could be created in a
greater number of districts, or the districting was a combination of
these two practices.  In any event, the result was that blacks were so
spread apart or so packed into a small number of districts that al-
though they could vote—and by hypothesis we could assume that
every eligible black voter voted—they could never vote in sufficient
numbers as to elect a candidate that would reflect their interests.  The
solution to this was to require racial gerrymandering, to guarantee
that not all black votes would be spread out across the state, diluting
black political power.  Instead, there had to be some ‘safe’ minority
districts, where black voters would be able to aggregate their votes
and effectively use their votes to elect a candidate of their choice.
Here, a structural problem (barriers to vote aggregation) demanded a
70. The discussion by Guinier is extremely helpful on this point. See GUINIER,
supra note 65, at 125 (discussing “collective interests” in Reynolds and Baker).
71. The history is outlined in THERNSTROM, supra note 56 (discussing development
in use of the Voting Rights Act). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989) (giving a brief history of the Voting Rights Act).  Karlan help-
fully distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative dilution, a distinction which I
put to one side for the purposes of this essay.
72. See BERNARD GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING 22, 24-25, 27 (1992) (noting that racial gerrymandering was used as a response
to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, even though it was common before the act).
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structural solution (designing districts that would facilitate vote ag-
gregation of a group).
What is important, and what I want to highlight in the case of
vote dilution is that—as these two examples show—having a theory of
vote dilution requires having a theory of what group you want to
favor; that is, it requires having a theory of whose votes you want to
successfully aggregate.  The individualist rhetoric of the Reynolds
opinion serves to obscure this point.73  It suggests that what it is doing
is equalizing individual voter power, so that “one man” has only “one
vote” and not more than one.  But this is not the true and deep mean-
ing of Reynolds.  Its true and deep meaning was the equalization of
the voting power as a group of urban voters relative to rural voters.  In
the same way, the impact of racial redistricting is to facilitate blacks
in their effort to aggregate their group power—so that they can vote
together, rather than being split up by creative districting on the part
of white legislators.  So if we are to talk about vote dilution, this is
always relative to some class of people whom we are worried cannot
effectively aggregate their votes into a “group” expression.  And this
requires a theory of which groups matter, or at the least, when it is
unfair that a group cannot effectively bring its voices together and
have effective political expression.  In Reynolds and Baker, the Court
determined that it was unfair that rural voters wielded more political
power per person than urban voters.  The Voting Rights Act (and its
subsequent interpretation) stood for the principle that it was impor-
tant not merely that blacks vote, but that their votes be made effec-
tive.  When we move into this type of territory, it becomes clear we
need a theory of which groups matter, and what types of aggregation
are good for democracy to function.  In other words, we have moved
into the area of democratic theory, as Justice Thomas forcefully
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall.74  The courts
are making choices and assumptions about what a healthy democracy
should look like—what groups should have the ability to have their
vote count.  It is precisely this kind of theorizing, as I discuss in the
remainder of this Part, which courts have been doing in several recent
voter fraud cases.
73. Gerken, supra note 64.  Gerken, however, believes that the right can still be
understood as an individual right, albeit a right to aggregate one’s vote with others.
74. 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring) (stating “by construing the
[Voting Rights] Act to cover potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have im-
mersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory-
questions judges must confront to establish a benchmark concept of an ‘undiluted’
vote”).
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C. PURCELL V. GONZALEZ: SETTING THE STAGE
I begin by considering the Supreme Court’s recent and very short
opinion in Purcell v. Gonzalez.75  The heart of the opinion, really only
a paragraph at the beginning of section two, has drawn criticism from
a number of election law scholars as being confused, confusing, and
even incoherent.76  At best, the reasoning has been considered sloppy.
Some context supplies a partial excuse for the decision’s apparent lack
of coherence: it was a decision quickly made and decided in order to
allow an election to go ahead as scheduled.  We might try to pardon
the decision’s sloppiness by comparing it to the time-pressured opinion
in Bush v. Gore.77  But the opinion, I think, has not been treated as
fairly as it should be.  True, the reasoning is very compressed—it only
hints at arguments and does not spell them out—but again, this is
probably true of most of the Court’s opinions.  All this requires is more
work on the part of the interpreter, a task we should welcome, espe-
cially given issues as contentious and complicated as voter fraud.  We
have to try our best to present the arguments that seem to be given in
the opinion in their best lights, and then assess the arguments.  We
should not assume that the Court did not really know what it was
talking about.
This should be especially the case with Purcell, as the Court cer-
tainly seems to be trying to speak in the language of the law of democ-
racy.  As I see it, the Court is trying to make two claims about the
state’s interest in voter fraud, both of which bear obvious comparisons
to the types of arguments we have been considering in this Part.  The
first claim is a broad (and admittedly somewhat vague) argument
about securing the “integrity” of elections.  The second claim is that
voter fraud dilutes the votes of legitimate voters.  I consider both of
these claims in turn; with the second claim, I refer mostly to Judge
Posner’s opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,78
which significantly elaborates and expands the argument that is only
hinted at in the Purcell opinion.  The argument in this Part suggests
75. 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006) (per curiam).
76. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (per curiam).  See Richard L. Hasen,
The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) (referring to the
opinion as “troubling”); Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law
of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743 (2007); Alex Keyssar, “Disenfranchised” When Words
Lose Meaning, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2006, available at http://www.huffington
post.com/alex-keyssar/disenfranchised-when-_b_32241.html; Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It
to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1065, 1067 (2007) (noting Purcell provides a “cautionary lesson” on court interven-
tion into elections).
77. But cf. Hasen, supra note 76, at 29 (declaring that the Court had not learned
the lessons of Bush v. Gore in Purcell).
78. 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated
with Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)).
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that these two claims—the one about integrity, and the other about
dilution—while analytically distinct, might be linked, especially in the
Purcell decision.  In Purcell, the worry about electoral integrity ulti-
mately turns out to be a worry about vote dilution.
The substantive issue the Court had to consider in Purcell was
what the state’s interest was in adding new requirements to the right
to vote, specifically the state’s interest in requiring citizens to present
proof of citizenship when registering to vote, and then to present photo
identification on the day they cast their vote.79  Is the state’s interest
in preventing fraud substantial enough to justify these additional bur-
dens on the individual’s right to vote? Although the Court ultimately
made a procedural point that allowed the restrictions to go into effect
(the lawsuit asked for an injunction against the new restrictions for
the 2006 election), it briefly dealt with the substantive issue.  And the
first interest the Court cited that the state has is an interest in the
integrity of the state’s elections.  Quoting from an earlier case, the
Court announced that a state “indisputably has a compelling interest
in preserving the integrity of its election process.”80  The Court goes
on to give this statement a rather interesting, and somewhat ambigu-
ous cast.  The Court reasoned that it is important that voters have
“confidence” in the way elections are run, that this is “essential to the
functioning of our participatory democracy.”81  The Court then rea-
soned that the risk of a lack of confidence is that voters will not vote;
they will become disillusioned with the process.  “Voter fraud,” the
Court noted, “drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and
breeds distrust of our government.”82  It is statements like this that
make many think that the Court needs something more than simply
its intuition to go on.  How many people really are driven out of the
process by a lack of confidence in electoral processes?83  Indeed, it is
sentences such as this that might have prompted Justice Stevens’
brief opinion in Purcell stating that before the Court can truly judge
the constitutionality of the measures, the Court needs a better record
in order to know whether voter fraud leads some people to become
disillusioned and not vote.84
I will return to whether we need statistics to decide the harm in
Part IV, but first I want to return to another worry scholars initially
79. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 6.
80. Id. at 7 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hasen, supra note 76.
84. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 8 (Stevens, J. concurring) (“Allowing the election to pro-
ceed without enjoining the statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with a
better record on which to judge their constitutionality.”).
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have had about the Purcell decision. Even from this short summary of
the Purcell Court’s discussion of the state’s interest, we can see an-
other reason (besides its brevity) that scholars have been dissatisfied
with the opinion.  Scholars are dissatisfied because the opinion seems
to cast everything about the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud
in the subjective.  The Court does not write, or does not primarily
write, of the state’s interest in electoral integrity; rather it talks of
voter confidence in the electoral process and distrust of government.
It is not so much the fact of fraud, the Court seems to be saying, as the
(subjective) perception that fraud might be occurring.  Likewise, the
Court does not write of direct vote dilution or disenfranchisement; in-
stead, the Court identifies the interest as voters perhaps fearing that
their vote will be diluted or of voters’ feelings of disenfranchisement.
But many have asked why it is bad merely if voters feel as if there is
fraud in the system?  A first response to this worry might simply be to
note that a concern about feelings and perceptions is evident in other
areas of election law (and law more generally).  We might, for in-
stance, ask a similar question in the context of campaign finance laws:
why is it bad that people perceive that the system is dominated by
money?  The worry about feelings, then, is not so genuinely new or
novel.  The Court has been confronted with it before.
However, the Purcell Court gave reasons why voter fears and feel-
ings might matter in the context of voter fraud, when the Court noted
that fraud might “drive[ ] honest citizens out of the democratic process
and breed[ ] distrust of our government.”85  These seem to be genu-
inely bad things, viz., people not voting because they feel that their
votes are worthless and distrusting the government because they
think their votes are not the ones actually electing people.  In an al-
most exactly similar way, we might want to prevent even the appear-
ance of corruption by moneyed interests, because it might drive people
from the democratic process, and it might lead people to distrust the
government.  So in both contexts, we seem to have an independent
reason just to heed people’s feelings.  It is no argument simply to say
that the law has no interest in promoting right perceptions; confidence
in the government is a good thing, and we should not deny that nor
deny that the state has an interest in encouraging confidence in the
government.  We should not disagree with the very notion that the
government might have an interest in the feelings and perceptions of
its citizens—especially if this will lead to decreased participation.86
85. Id. at 7.
86. Keyssar seems to deny that feelings and perception may matter, although this
may be an artifact of his rhetoric. See Keyssar, supra note 76 (“In its unsigned opinion,
the court justified its decision by claiming that ‘voters who fear their legitimate votes
will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.’ FEEL disenfranchised?
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The government can, and should, have this interest which we might
call an interest in avoiding the demoralization of citizens.87
At the same time, and to this extent, those who suspect that feel-
ings might not be the most reliable guide to policy-making have a
point.  We simply do not want to credit any feelings potential voters
might have.  They may simply be imagining things.  As one lower
court put it, perceptions are fickle, they can be manipulated.88  Al-
though feelings and perceptions are important, as I have insisted,
they cannot be given carte blanche.  Here it seems useful to invoke
Robert Post’s idea of a “warranted conviction” in the functioning of a
democracy.89  Post says that people have to feel that they are actually
creating the laws (or electing the representatives) in a democracy, so
feelings matter.  But Post goes on to say that those feelings must be
warranted, that is, they must be grounded in something besides
merely the feelings themselves.  There have to be facts and values
which support those feelings, because a feeling itself might be nothing
more than a prejudice unless it is supported by reasons.  Even if we
give feelings a presumptive legitimacy, we need to be clear that the
presumption of legitimacy can be overridden if the feelings seem to
have no deeper ground than themselves.  Feelings do not always jus-
tify themselves.
There are at least two ways in which feelings can be unsupported.
First, we can be mistaken about the facts.  Citizens may fear fraud
even when there is no fraud.  If this is the case, then we certainly
should not cater to their erroneous perceptions.  If the harm is imagi-
nary, it does not become a state’s interest simply based on the fact
that voters perceive that the harm is really there; that is, the state
does not gain an interest in legislating against it.  If anything, the
state has an interest in combating the false perception, not in catering
Is that the same as ‘being disenfranchised’? So if I might ‘feel’ disenfranchised, I have a
right to make it harder for you to vote? What on earth is going on here?”).
87. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 130 (1991) (developing
this idea).  The Northern District of Ohio went the furthest in emphasizing the harm of
demoralization. See League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (“Where persons who are eligible to vote lose faith that their ballot will
count, they will conclude that voting does not matter.  They may decline to exercise the
franchise, thereby giving up the most fundamental right of our democracy as completely
as if it had been taken from them forcibly.”).  I am indebted to Joey Fishkin for this
reference.
88. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 218 (Mo. 2006) (“While the state does
have an interest in combating those perceptions, where the fundamental rights of Mis-
souri citizens are at stake, more than mere perception is required for their
abridgement.”).
89. For a representative use, see Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Por-
traits of Muhammad, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 72, 74 (2007) (stating “the practice of self-
government requires that a people have the warranted conviction that they are engaged
in the process of governing themselves.”).
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to it.  So, this may be another motivation for those who want more and
better studies: they want to know whether voters’ fear of fraud is
something that is based on the facts, or is simply imaginary.  But the
second way feelings go wrong does not depend on numbers; voters may
be afraid of the wrong thing or afraid in a disproportionate way.  Sup-
pose that voters feared something that was there, but was actually
quite harmless.  This would also raise suspicions about whether the
state had an interest in catering to that fear, but not because the thing
did not exist, but because it was not that harmful in the first place.
The first way feelings might err is one that most scholars have been
interested in; I have already stated my reasons why I am not sure
statistics will be decisive (unless, perhaps, the statistics showed that
there was absolutely no fraud and no possibility of fraud).90  Now, I
am more concerned with whether the feelings people might have
about voter fraud might be based on some real worries and not just
imaginary ones.
D. STRUCTURE IN PURCELL: WHAT IS ELECTORAL INTEGRITY?
What are some real worries people might have about electoral in-
tegrity?  Let me begin with two interests: one that I will call the “rule
of law” worry, and the other which I will call the worry about “massive
fraud.”  The two interests I am going to discuss in the remainder of
this section strike me as real interests, that is, they seem to be inter-
ests that the state really has.  Also, to the extent that they are real
interests, there is also an interest in preventing people from feeling
that such violations of the state’s interests are occurring.  In other
words, the realness of the interests gives rise to an additional interest
of the state—which is to prevent the demoralization of citizens by the
perception that such interests are being violated.  The two interests
that I cover in this section are not, however, the Court’s major focus,
but they nonetheless may work in the background of the Court’s opin-
ion, so it will be important to discuss them for this reason.  It is also
important for the purposes of my Essay, for I am going to argue (in
Part IV) that in fact these are the only legitimate interests the state
has in preventing voter fraud. The focus in Purcell is on vote dilution,
but it turns out that dilution is not a real state interest, at least when
we are considering the incremental vote dilution that is possibly
caused by a few fraudulent votes.
90. In this rare event, the perception of fraud would be wholly unwarranted.
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1. Violating the rule of law
The first worry the Court might be addressing is the state’s inter-
est in upholding and sustaining rule-of-law values.  In other words,
the state has an interest in the integrity of the election system it has
set up, to the extent that it does not want people to violate the law,
and thus violate the “integrity” of the election process.  We can give
this state interest a subjective cast in the following way: if people see
others breaking the law by frequently voting, they might come to be
disillusioned with the government.  Of course, this is a perfectly gen-
eral interest that the state has—it is at stake when the state passes a
law against speeding, or a law against littering (to revert again to
Judge Posner’s example).  In these cases, the fact that people break
the law may also cause people to lose confidence in the government.
The state and the citizens in the state may be harmed simply insofar
as people break the law; such law breaking (which voter fraud indis-
putably is) harms the state because it questions the state’s authority,
and it represents some people getting an unfair advantage.  Consider
how although parking in a no-parking zone may not physically harm
anyone, the state still is justified in prosecuting the person who did it
because it is not fair to flout the law like that.91  The state has set up
its laws, and presuming those laws are not unjust and were arrived at
through some democratic process, the state has the authority to up-
hold those laws.  I do not think we can doubt that there is an interest
here.
Is this the interest the Court is getting at in its argument in Pur-
cell?  I would think not.  The problem is that it seems like too generic a
value; in the sentences following the quote from Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Community92 the Court goes on to make
specific points about the voters’ feelings and the importance of confi-
dence in the electoral process.93  The Court is not simply talking about
the state’s interest in preventing the law from being violated—which
an interest it has in upholding every law, not just in election laws.
And when the Court turns to voter perceptions, it is talking about
more than simply the perception that the government’s law-making
authority is being flouted.  The harms the Court cites as coming from
the violation of election law seem too specially tailored to the election
law context to have the harm simply be this generic: an interest that
the laws not be broken.  Doubtless, this is certainly a state interest,
91. On the idea that fairness requires us to obey the law, see JOHN RAWLS, LEGAL
OBLIGATION AND THE DUTY OF FAIR PLAY, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney
Hook ed., 1964).
92. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
93. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
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even in the election context, but one might think that it is an interest
better served simply by more aggressive prosecution of those who
break the law, not by proposing new restrictions on the ability to
vote—especially since the Court goes on to say that there are values
on the other side of the equation, namely, the interest of those who
want to vote and who might not because of the new restrictions.  Of
course, this last point needs an argument, and I will attempt to give it
one in the next Part.  For the time being, though, the claim is only that
the state’s interest in preventing people from breaking any laws, while
a real value, does not seem to be the value the Court is after.  It is
after a specific election-based harm that is caused by violating laws
having to do with the election of candidates.  So I think, if we want to
discern the meaning of electoral integrity and the state’s interest in
upholding the integrity, we will have to find something more tailored
to the electoral context.  This leads me to a second worry, to which I
now turn.
2. Massive Fraud
The second worry that people might have about electoral integrity
is the concern that an election without integrity is an election that
does not do what an election is ultimately supposed to do, that is, elect
the candidate with the most legitimate votes.94  If there is so much
fraud that it is in doubt whether the right candidate won, then there is
a real problem with the integrity of the election system.  Basically the
election system has no integrity because it is not a reliable system of
tallying the right votes.  It has, instead, become so corrupt that it fails
to even be an election.  Voters might ask themselves, why did we
bother to vote, rather than just holding a lottery and choosing the win-
ner that way?  Thus, fraud will clearly compromise the integrity of an
election when fraud reaches such a level that it calls into question
whether the election has chosen the correct candidate.  Note that here
there is a role for reliable studies: we need to know when an election
has become so corrupt, so permeated by fraud, that it can no longer be
counted on to accurately reflect who the winning candidate is (again,
the candidate who has the most legitimate votes).  But here, statistical
analysis plays only a role at the limit, and will not be useful in most
cases.  We will need studies to say when an election is thoroughly cor-
rupt, thus corrupt on a massive scale, to see if it lacks integrity in the
sense discussed herein.  We will not need to know if there is some low
level of fraud, because even a small amount of fraud will still allow the
election to select the legitimate winner.  Of course, there will be excep-
94. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (discuss-
ing the purposes of voting).
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tions; there will be some elections where the final tally is so close that
even a low level of fraud could tip the election to the wrong candidate.
However, this will generally not be the case.
So here is one case where the perception that there has been mas-
sive fraud is bad, because massive fraud is bad—it suggests that the
election might have gone to the wrong candidate.  What could be a
better example of an election losing legitimacy than an election that
did not even do its job of electing the candidate with the most legiti-
mate votes?  The state has a real interest in preventing this kind of
lack of confidence in the election system, because massive fraud gives
people a reason to lose confidence that their votes have really done
any work in electing a candidate.  It is here that we hit something
deep in the idea that an election may be illegitimate because of voter
fraud.  If fraud means that the election is a sham, then this is a prob-
lem—and it is a problem even to the extent that we want to avoid the
perception that the election is not a sham.  This will only really hap-
pen (as I argue in more detail in the next Part) either when there is a
lot of fraud, so much fraud that the election is clearly corrupt, or
whether the election is so close that even minor fraud might tip the
election the wrong way.
But the Purcell Court seems to suggest that feelings of illegiti-
macy may even be caused by minor fraud, and even when minor fraud
would not be outcome determinative, because it might be that even
one fraudulent vote may make some voters feel that their vote does
not really count, or count as fully as it might.  This is the perception
that the impact of their vote may be diluted, and this happens even if
there are one or two votes that are cast illegally.  It is this worry, I
think, that is ultimately at the heart of the Court’s analysis—not so
much the worry that the election might be completely corrupt, in the
sense that the election will not choose the legitimate winner.  So we
should take care to analyze the idea that voter fraud might be harmful
insofar as it dilutes the votes of legitimate voters.  For if dilution in
the end is the real worry, then the Court’s concern about electoral in-
tegrity (and about perceptions about electoral integrity) in the context
of voter fraud turns out simply to be a concern to protect the value of
the right to an undiluted vote.  Whether this is a correct understand-
ing of the idea of vote dilution, or even an understanding of vote dilu-
tion at all, I leave to Part IV.  What I am concerned with now is simply
trying to understand it, for it seems that this interest is what the
Court is most concerned with in its brief discussion of electoral
integrity.
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E. STRUCTURE IN PURCELL AND CRAWFORD: VOTE DILUTION
The concern about vote dilution in the context of voter fraud can
be stated most directly in this way: People will become disillusioned if
they feel that the impact of their votes will be diluted by the existence
of fraudulent votes.  As the Court reasons, “[v]oters who fear their le-
gitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disen-
franchised.”95  In contrast to the worry raised in the previous section,
about the existence of massive fraud leading to the wrong result, the
worry about vote dilution happens even if one person fraudulently
votes.  In that case, the worry is that an individual’s vote will not have
the same impact (will be outweighed) when combined with other legit-
imate votes because it has been watered down by the existence of
fraudulent votes.  In other words, the harm of vote dilution does not
work the same way as the harm of damaging electoral integrity: vote
dilution works in degrees, whereas the possibility of having an elec-
tion go the wrong way only works if there is enough fraud to make the
election outcome different than it might otherwise be.  But if one per-
son fraudulently votes against the candidate I have voted for, I might
feel that my vote no longer has the same influence—and that is the
case even if the opposing, fraudulent vote is the only fraudulent vote
that there is.  Note how this trades on the idea that votes should not
just be counted, but also be meaningful.  My vote has less meaning
than it would have if only legitimate voters had voted, and for this
reason, I might lack confidence in the electoral process: the process is
not giving my vote the same weight as it would have if there were no
fraud in the system.  If this happens repeatedly, I may question the
value of voting at all.  Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion (and this is
where it is both at its most interesting and at its weakest) offers no
further analysis of whether voters really are disenfranchised, only
that they might feel disenfranchised.  What we need to know is
whether the feeling has any underlying justification, or instead is
nothing more than a feeling.  Does voter fraud really result in vote
dilution in any meaningful sense?
The Court does not give us any analysis on this point.  Instead,
the Court only offers a quote from Reynolds v. Sims: “The right of suf-
frage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exer-
cise of the franchise.”96  This line is important for the Court to quote
because it links vote dilution and disenfranchisement.  But quoting
the line also simply invites the question of whether, even if it is true
that we can equate at some level prohibition and dilution, in the case
95. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
96. Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
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of fraud votes are debased or diluted in a salient way—the way in
which the majority in Reynolds felt was salient.  We are not given an
extensive analysis of the analogy.  The Court only categorizes the vote
dilution claim as a fear, but does not connect that fear with any justifi-
cation.  But where the Purcell Court does not give us much help,
Judge Posner in his opinion extends and amplifies the analogy.  Pos-
ner develops, where the Court does not, the analogy to vote dilution,
citing the Court’s opinion in Purcell, but expanding on it.  It is his
opinion that offers us the best defense of the idea that voters really
might be disenfranchised by voter fraud, and not merely that voter
fraud might cause them to harbor doubts that the election as a whole
might be illegitimate.  Using Posner’s opinion in Crawford, I want to
unpack the claim that voter fraud is a type of vote dilution.
1. “Both sides of the ledger”
Posner begins the substantive part of his opinion with a striking
phrase, one that we should be sure we capture the correct meaning of
because read one way it can be seriously misleading. Posner writes
that applying a strict standard to laws that attempt to regulate the
right to vote would be inappropriate in analyzing a case such as the
one before the Court in Crawford, specifically where a law is passed in
order to reduce the incidences of voter fraud.  Why?  Posner reasons
that it is because “the right to vote is on both sides of the ledger.”97
The language of a right being on both sides of the ledger is familiar.  It
is familiar in the domain of the First Amendment, where the idea is
that people’s First Amendment rights may be implicated both when
the state limits some speech, but also when the state allows some
speech which could chill the speech of others (or have some other ad-
verse impact on people’s right to speak freely).  Breyer has developed
this claim most notably on the Court, whereas in academia, Owen Fiss
has been most thoughtful in explicating the concept of a right being on
both sides of the ledger.98  Fiss has written about the right to speech
being on both sides of the ledger in the context of laws regulating por-
97. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated with Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)).
98. See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J, concurring) (stating that First
Amendment interests lie on “both sides”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF
FREE SPEECH 19 (1996) (“Indeed, one way of describing this situation is simply to say
that now speech appears on both sides of the equation, as a value threatened by regula-
tion and a countervalue furthered by it.”).
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nography.  It is helpful to review Fiss’ use of “both sides” in the expres-
sion context before turning to its use in the voter fraud context.99
In what way is the right to free speech on “both sides of the
ledger” when dealing with a law against some forms of expression?
On the one hand, supposing that the state banned some kinds of ex-
tremely explicit pornography, we might say that it is limiting speech.
But on the other hand, we might also think that the existence of por-
nography chills the speech of some women because it makes them be-
lieve that their speech is valueless and not worthy of expression.  We
might conclude that in considering an anti-pornography regulation,
free speech is on “both sides of the ledger,” because pornographers
might have a right to speech, but women also have the right to express
themselves without being chilled by violent and objectifying images,
or risk having their speech not taken seriously.  It is important to see,
in unraveling this analogy, that the right to free speech, as Fiss un-
derstands it, is not implicated in the same way on both sides of the
ledger.
There are two immediately relevant differences.  The first is that
whereas on the one side the state is limiting the speech by its actions,
on the other side the action of others is limiting the speech.  The state
bans pornography so the pornographers have their speech limited.
This is clear enough.  However, Fiss also wants to say that by allowing
pornography, the state might also be sending the message that wo-
men’s voices do not matter and are not important. This too could re-
present an abridgement or debasement of the right to free speech, an
abridgment that the state does not directly cause (as in the case of a
ban on pornography) but one that it permits.  The direct cause is sim-
ply the voices of others (namely, the pornographers).  The second, less
obvious difference is that the kind of value at stake on each side is
different.  For the pornographers, the value is simply speech.  If there
is a ban on pornography, they cannot sell it or promote it, etc.  But
with the women, who would otherwise be chilled, the free speech value
is the ability to participate in a meaningful way.  To be sure, women
may simply be chilled and not speak, but more deeply, even if they did
speak, there is a risk—with the presence of images that make out wo-
men to be objects—that others would not take their speech seriously.
So Fiss is saying that good communication requires a background of
equality, and since pornography hurts equality, it can also hurt
speech.  Fiss is explicit that this is a structural claim that he is mak-
ing: he is saying that speech is not just talk, but that it requires a
99. Here I borrow from Fiss’ analysis in his book Liberalism Divided, chapter four,
“Freedom and Feminism.” See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 67-88 (1996).
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certain background structure to make that talk meaningful, to make it
part of a democratic conversation.100  Allowing pornography may per-
mit pornographers to talk, but it may hurt the possibilities of a better
and more expansive exchange of viewpoints.  Fiss, in other words, is
saying that the value of free speech is on both sides of the ledger, but
on one side the value is primarily individual, while on the other side it
is structural.101
2. The interests of legitimate voters
The same logic that applies in the First Amendment context ap-
plies when we look at Posner’s analysis of the right to vote.  On the
one side, there is the individual right to vote.  This is the participatory
right that is implicated when the state puts up new obstacles to the
right to vote.  The question here is how burdensome is the regulation
on the individual’s right to vote?  Posner offers as an example of this
type of regulation, the poll tax—which in Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections102 was ruled as unjustifiably burdensome on the
right to vote.  Posner recognizes that a similar question is at play in
this case, viz., whether requiring photo identification puts too great of
a barrier in front of people who want to vote (Posner thinks clearly
not, but we will get to this).  On the other side, there is also the value
of the right to vote.  How?  Posner starts by helpfully distinguishing
the issue in this case from the issue in the poll tax case: there the
issue was whether you could tax people in order to raise money to help
pay the cost of elections.103  Posner says that raising money to help
defray costs does not implicate the right to vote in the same way that
requiring people to pay a poll tax to vote does.  Of course, we might
wonder about this: it would certainly not be the case if the state raised
money for general revenues from a poll tax.  Could they not say that
the right to vote was on both sides, because the money actually went
towards the proper functioning of elections?
Put this quibble with Posner’s analogy to one side.  What Posner
wants to get at by contrasting the poll tax revenue from efforts to de-
ter voter fraud is that there is a more direct relationship between re-
ducing voter fraud and protecting the right to vote (as opposed to the
100. See, e.g., id.  Fiss specifically provides:
Democracy requires that everyone have an equal chance to speak and to be
heard.  The trafficking provision, aimed as it is at the pornography industry in
its most extreme form, should be seen as a friend rather than an enemy of
democracy: an effort to establish the preconditions for free and open debate.
Id. at 87.
101. See FISS, supra note 99 at 31-46 (discussing the role of the state in establishing
the preconditions for meaningful conversation, in chapter two, “Why the State?”).
102. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
103. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952.
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relationship between raising revenue and the right to vote).  Specifi-
cally he states that “[t]he purpose of the Indiana law is to reduce vot-
ing fraud, and voting fraud impairs the right of legitimate voters to
vote by diluting their votes-dilution being recognized to be an impair-
ment of the right to vote.”104  Now, the wrong way to read this would
be the following: voter fraud impairs the right to vote in the same way
that obstructing someone’s ability to register or to actually vote im-
pairs the right to vote.105  This is wrong, and Posner does not say this.
Rather, voter fraud works indirectly by diluting votes, that is, by de-
creasing the weight a vote has, not by preventing the vote from being
cast altogether.  Voter fraud of a sort might prevent the vote from be-
ing counted (say if someone destroyed many ballots), but this is not
the kind of fraud that is at issue in the Crawford or Purcell cases.  The
fraud in these cases results from people voting who are not registered
to vote or who lack the proper identification.  The fraud occurs
through adding votes to the total votes cast, not by canceling any one
person’s vote.  And it is other people who are the direct cause of this,
not the state (as it would be in the case of a poll tax), although the
state can certainly indirectly contribute to this by lax enforcement of
voter fraud laws.  This is exactly like the first difference we discussed
in Fiss’ scenario above.
The second difference comes when we notice that the harm is not
preventing participation (as it might be in the case of new restrictions
on the right to vote) but in causing dilution, and that dilution is a
structural harm.  It involves an analysis at a level higher than the
individual’s vote.  Dilution does not stop any one individual from vot-
ing, indeed, a condition of having your vote diluted is that you actually
have voted.  Dilution works instead by making the votes of people who
have voted less meaningful, much like the speech of pornographers
might make the speech of women seem less meaningful.  But if this is
the case, then we cannot look simply at the right to vote that is impli-
cated by preventing voter fraud as purely an individual right.  That is
because the right is, in essence, about how one can meaningfully ag-
gregate one’s vote with other like-minded individuals.  In the same
way that the right to speak for women as a group could be hurt, not by
direct state prohibition, but by the acts of others (which chills the
speech of women), so too can voter fraud hurt the legitimate voters as
104. Id.
105. This is the mistake “Publius” falls into. See Publius, Securing the Integrity of
American Elections: The Need for Change, 9 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 277, 278 (2005) (“Every
vote that is stolen through fraud disenfranchises a voter who has cast a legitimate bal-
lot in the same way that an individual who is eligible to vote is disenfranchised when he
is kept out of a poll or is somehow otherwise prevented from casting a ballot.”).  Publius
does not offer any analysis of this point, only assertions.
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a group, not by the state directly preventing them from voting, but by
the fraudulent acts of individuals.  In trying to prevent fraud, we are
trying to protect the conditions that would make every legitimate vote
a meaningful one and not be watered down by the existence of fraudu-
lent votes.  Again, this analysis of the right to vote matches almost
exactly with Fiss’ analysis of the right to free speech.
What deserves our attention (and here we depart from the Fiss
analogy and move more deeply into the voting context) is that the
claim of dilution picks out legitimate voters as a salient group, explic-
itly so in both the Purcell and Crawford opinions.106  Just as the one
person one vote claims picked out urban voters as a meaningful group,
and the Voting Rights Act made blacks a relevant interest group, so
too does the voting fraud claim say that legitimate voters as a group
have the right to have their votes not be diluted by the votes of fraudu-
lent voters.  It is their votes that are diluted.  Legitimate voters share
an interest in grouping together their votes.  When voters who do not
have the right identification vote, they make this grouping less mean-
ingful.  Suppose I legitimately vote for the winning candidate, but
there is a fraudulent vote for the loser.  Although my vote has not been
canceled (it is still counted), the weight of my vote is diminished be-
cause the margin of victory for the winner is no longer the same.  In a
similar way, my vote is made less meaningful by a fraudulent vote for
the winner when I voted for the losing candidate.  Again, my grouping
with other legitimate voters-for-the-loser means less, compared to the
grouping of fraudulent-plus-legitimate voters for the winner.  Accord-
ing to this line of thought, stopping fraud is an interest that the class
of legitimate voters have as a whole—and notably, it is an interest
they have together regardless of if they have voted for different candi-
dates (I return to this shortly).  Moreover, it is an interest that can be
incrementally affected because each illegitimate vote harms the group
of legitimate voters a little more.  It makes their vote have less of an
impact on the outcome of the election.
It pays to emphasize once more how this is a structural concern,
not merely an individual concern (although it might misleadingly be
phrased in that way). When additional fraudulent voters vote, my in-
dividual vote is not ruined, because it is still counted.  Instead, dilu-
tion affects how I am able to group my vote with others: what our vote
means collectively.  At the limit, fraudulent voters will overwhelm le-
gitimate voters, thus creating a fraudulent election.  The class of legit-
imate voters (those in the majority and those in the minority alike)
106. See Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7 (“Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be out-
weighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”); Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (stat-
ing “voting fraud impairs the right of legitimate voters to vote by diluting their votes”).
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will have been prevented from collectively producing a legitimate elec-
tion.  Now, the group interest here is tricky because it is not a group
interest in having a particular candidate elected, as it might be in
other contexts; instead, it is an interest in having a legitimate elec-
tion.  Under this line of thought, having a legitimate election is not
something we can do individually; instead, it is something we do to-
gether qua voters who have the right identification and who are legiti-
mately registered to vote.  Each time someone fraudulently votes, that
interest is impaired by making our legitimate votes have less of an
impact on the final election tally.  We need to be careful, then, when
reading the Court’s opinion in Purcell when the Court emphasizes the
individual voter’s fear that the voter may be disenfranchised by vote
dilution.107  The interest is not that the voter’s vote will not count, but
that it will not count in the same way—it will not be part of an elec-
tion that is completely legitimate.  The meaning of the vote for legiti-
mate voters will get garbled by the votes of voters who are not
registered or who vote without the proper identification.
Let me conclude this Part by returning in a more general way to
the Court’s opinion in Purcell.  I have tried, in a way, to defend the
Court from the criticism that the Court is simply defending the state’s
interest in preventing citizens from having certain feelings towards
the electoral process—lack of confidence, fear of corruption, feelings of
disenfranchisement.  I have tried to show that, underneath these feel-
ings, there may be real harms that would prove the feelings war-
ranted.  The state would then have an interest, not in correcting those
feelings, but in preventing the types of things that would give rise to
those feelings.  The state has an interest in preventing law-breaking
in general; however, this interest seemed too generic to be exactly
what the Court was worried about.  Nor did it seem that the Court
was interested in preventing massive fraud, although I cited this as an
interest the state may have, the Court would certainly not want it to
be the case that the election was so pervaded by fraud that there was
a serious concern that the wrong candidate had been elected.  But the
Court seemed to want a state interest in electoral integrity that fell
short of outcome determinative voter fraud—and we found this in the
notion of vote dilution.  The state had an interest in protecting the
weight of legitimate voters’ votes from dilution by fraudulent votes.
This interest exists prior to the existence of massive voter fraud.  By
looking at Posner’s opinion in Crawford, I have tried to show that
there at least is a colorable claim to an interest here—an interest that
we might think is similar to the interest against dilution that is pre-
sent in the Reynolds and Baker opinions, as well as the Voting Rights
107. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
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Act cases.  What remains to be seen is whether this interest stands up
to scrutiny.  I conclude that it does not.  The interest of legitimate vot-
ers, it turns out, is a much narrower and less defensible one than is
present in other cases of vote dilution.
IV. BALANCING VOTER FRAUD AND VOTER DETERRENCE
In the previous Part, I was concerned mostly with the state’s in-
terest in passing measures that would restrict access to the right to
vote in order to deter voter fraud.  I was largely uncritical of that de-
fense, wanting mostly to present it in the strongest form possible, es-
pecially where this meant connecting up the analysis in the Purcell
and Crawford opinions with the latest scholarship in election law.  I
wanted to show that if the Court errs in these cases, it is not for want
of speaking a common language with the leading scholarship on the
subject; indeed, it speaks in terms of corruption and dilution, terms
familiar to anyone who works in the area of election law, where schol-
ars have been trying to hammer out the meaning of these terms over
the past two decades.  I also did not discuss, except in passing, the
interest on the other side of the ledger (as Posner put it); the possible
participatory interest in those who might otherwise vote were it not
for additional restrictions on the right to vote.  In this Part, I try to
remedy these two omissions.  In the first section, I discuss—by way of
an analogy with a case where there are mistakes in tabulating the
results of an election—the interest of the state in preventing vote dilu-
tion among legitimate voters.  I find that this interest is a minor one,
except in the rare case where fraud might end up tipping the balance
of an election.  In the end, there is no real difference between the
state’s interest in preventing a few miscounts in tabulation, and the
state’s interest in preventing a few fraudulent votes.  Because the in-
terest is small in the former case, it is likewise small in the latter case
as well.
In the second and third sections, I defend the interest in voters
participating in an election, even at the risk of some fraud.  In the
second section, I try to distance my analysis from a consideration of
whether voter regulations unfairly burden some groups and not others
(such as the poor, minorities, or women).  I do not think this is the
main question—at least it is not the one I am interested in.  The key
question for me is where we set the baseline for voters.  Generally,
should the state be worried more about excluding voters who do not
have the necessary identification, or about including them?  Given the
small interest in preventing fraud, I find no good reason for the state
not to try to cast its net as wide as possible, that is, to include as many
voters as it can, subject to reasonable qualifications.  In the third sec-
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tion, I back up and assess the reasoning in both the Purcell and Craw-
ford opinions to see how the courts might have erred.  Ironically, their
error was precisely in focusing too much on worries about corruption,
fraud, and vote dilution and not enough on the more basic right of
political participation—that is, the individual’s right to vote.  To the
extent that the courts were following the latest scholarship in the law
of democracy, their decisions show the limitations of that type of schol-
arship, at least in analyzing voter fraud cases.  The good news, how-
ever, is that the courts are much better suited to apply the value of
participation in these cases, a value that speaks against passing addi-
tional restrictions on the right to vote, even if these only deter a few
voters from voting.  This last point goes directly to the question of judi-
cial competence and voter fraud, which I deal with in the final section
of this Part.
A. VOTER FRAUD AND ERRORS IN TABULATION
Of the many strands of election scholarship and controversy
spawned by Bush v. Gore,108 one of the more prominent strands was
election administration.109  How important was it that everyone not
only has the right to vote, some asked, but to have an equal chance to
have their vote counted?110  Several lawsuits were brought against
states that had disparities in voter technology—some counties had ad-
vanced technology that allowed the votes to be counted even if the
marks were not clear or that informed voters if they had not voted in a
particular race, while other counties did not.111  These cases pressed
the question, did the result in Bush not require that each county have
similar standards?  But perhaps obscured in the debate over equality
was the obvious fact that no voting technology is absolutely perfect.
We can try to attain perfection, but will probably fail to reach it (this
is why it is more reasonable to go for equality in technology than for
perfect technology, should it exist).  In other words, there seems to be
a tolerable amount of error in tabulating votes that we feel is inevita-
ble, or that we are willing to live with.  We do not say that all expense
should be taken to reduce mistakes in tabulating votes; we say that
some expense should be made, and we should aim for equality.  How-
108. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
109. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Demo-
cratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711 (2005) (discussing problems in election admin-
istration); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in
Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007) (updating his earlier work).
110. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Equal Chance to Have One’s Vote Count, 21 LAW &
PHILOSOPHY 121 (2002) (interpreting Bush v. Gore’s equal protection argument).
111. See the discussion of cases in Chad Flanders, Comment, Bush v. Gore and the
Uses of “Limiting,” 116 YALE L.J. 1159 (2007).
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ever, perfection is not required, as long as the standards do not fall
radically short of acceptable.
This acceptance shows something significant about the state’s in-
terest in the overall integrity of the election.  Mistakes in tabulation
also implicate the state’s interest in having an election process that
has integrity.  Furthermore, mistakes in tabulation can result in
someone’s vote going uncounted.  From one point of view, this is a
clear denial of the right to vote.  But it is not likely that a lawsuit
brought by someone who had his vote go uncounted—supposing a per-
son could discover such a thing—would get very far.112  Why?  Again,
it is because we understand that perfection is not a reasonable stan-
dard to expect the state to aspire to.  Also, and getting closer to the
subject of this Essay, it may be the case that some votes that were not
clearly punched will end up getting counted even though the person
did not follow the instructions on how to punch the ballot—so in a
way, that vote will be illegitimately counted, and it will dilute the
votes of those who did cleanly punch their ballot. Yet here as well, I
imagine our intuition is that this is acceptable.  We do not demand
perfection.  Sometimes there are just mistakes, and mistakes are a
part of life.  Not all errors in administration give rise to a cause of
action.113
However, there is a big difference when mistakes rise to the level
of being what I will call (for lack of a better term) massive or outcome
determinative errors. When there is a massive amount of errors, it
calls into question whether the right person has won the election.
Suppose that there is so much error that no one can be certain that
the election result is a product of the votes cast or of an error in the
machinery.  Then this rises above the level of a mere mistake that we
can live with and suggests that there should be another election.  Re-
latedly, the mistake may reach the level of a serious state interest,
even though it is not massive, but because the election is close and the
mistake is potentially outcome determinative (this might have been
the case in Bush v. Gore).  But this will likely be rare.  Most elections
do not turn on margin-of-error numbers and so there is no need to be
absolutely sure that there are no mistakes.114  There is just the con-
tinuing interest in preventing massive levels of mistakes.  For it is
here that the state has an indisputable interest in the integrity of the
election—and in the most basic way—the state wants to be sure that
112. See, e.g., Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying voters who
were the victim of tabulation errors any relief).
113. But see infra note 146.
114. See Fabrice Lehoucq, Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences, 6
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 233, 251 (2003) (“The colorful history of vote fabrication probably
exaggerates its role in determining election outcomes.”).
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the electoral process has given us the right candidate, i.e., the candi-
date who received the most votes.  An election certainly lacks integrity
if it does not fulfill its most basic mission—electing the candidate with
the most legitimate votes—however else it might lack integrity
The state’s interest in preventing fraud is almost exactly similar
to the state’s interest in preventing mistakes in vote tabulation.  Of
course, there is one large exception, and that is that voter fraud in-
volves breaking the law.  I will consider this difference, but the main
point is that insofar as we have an interest in electoral integrity and a
legitimate election, that interest is just as much a compromise in that
integrity as a tabulation error.  Or to put it another way, insofar as
the group of legitimate voters qua legitimate voters has an interest in
elections being run without any mistakes in the count that would af-
fect the weight and value of their vote, that interest is identical in the
fraud and mistake cases.  So if there is no interest that is seriously
damaged by minor error, then there is likewise no interest that is seri-
ously damaged by low level fraud.  The trouble comes, I think, in
treating “legitimate voters” as a group that can be harmed by incre-
mental dilution.  They are not traditionally thought of as sharing an
“interest.”  Again, those who are “legitimate voters” can include voters
on both sides, those who vote for a candidate and those who vote
against a candidate.115  So it is not as if a candidate of choice—to use
the phrase from the Voting Rights Act line of cases—is something that
legitimate voters are being denied.  The harm is not that one’s vote is
being given less weight in support of a candidate; one’s vote is being
given less weight in support of the election being legitimate.  But if
legitimacy is compatible with some low level dilution in the case of
error—and there is no reason why minor tabulation error should be
seen as compromising the legitimacy of an election—then legitimacy
should also be compatible with some low level fraud, that is, so long as
the fraud does not tip the balance of an election, which would obvi-
ously make the election illegitimate.
To put the point simply, it does not seem to be the case that every
single instance of vote dilution caused by additional fraudulent votes
makes each voter’s vote less of a part of a legitimate election.  This is
115. We might argue that if a group is as large as the class of legitimate voters is,
we cease to have an interest in the group at all and are better off considering it as a
“structural value.”  I am not sure about this.  On the one hand, it seems better, for
clarity’s sake, just to cease calling it dilution when the “dilution” threatens such a large
class.  It is better to see it based on, as Heather Gerken suggests, “a structural principle
regarding the way democracy should function.”  Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1677, 1726-27 (2001).  On the other
hand, dilution itself is a structural principle, and it is not clear that the very idea of
dilution forbids referring to a group as large and as diverse as “legitimate voters.” Id.
In the end, I am not sure it matters whether we call this a case of vote dilution or not.
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compatible with saying that there is a tipping point where vote dilu-
tion becomes so bad that the election becomes illegitimate.  But the
election is not illegitimate before then.  My claim, then, is not that
legitimate voters cannot be understood as a group, and it is not even
that we cannot understand their votes as being diluted.  Rather, the
problem is that their interest—the legitimacy and the integrity of an
election—is not the kind of thing that vote dilution really harms, ex-
cept in cases where there is so much fraud that it is outcome
determinative.
But what about the key difference between fraud and mistake,
namely that fraud is breaking the law and mistake is not?  We should
begin by noting two things about the crime of fraud in the instances of
fraud contemplated by the courts in both Purcell and Crawford.  First,
the fraud is never the type that cancels a vote, that is, makes it the
case that a vote is not counted.  We are not talking about the type of
fraud where many votes are thrown out or destroyed.  If we were, then
we might have a case where the basic participatory interest of the in-
dividual was being violated—and on this ground the individual might
have a complaint (though again, it is not clear whether he would get
relief for this complaint in a way that would allow him to vote again).
But here we are talking about votes that are cast in addition to the
votes that have been cast legitimately.  That is, in these cases, those
who pass additional restrictions on the right to vote are worried about
extra voters (most notably, immigrants) who might fraudulently vote.
So the harm in these cases is always one of dilution and not one of
cancellation.
This point bears emphasis.  Cancellation seems to be a much more
direct harm than dilution, especially if—as in this case—the harm of
dilution is really quite hard to specify when there are only a few in-
stances of fraud.  Further, it is probably not always the case that the
fraud perpetrated by illegal voters is always intentional.  Some people
may be allowed to vote even if they do not have the proper identifica-
tion.  In other words, they may be given a pass by poll workers or by
those who are registering them to vote.  In cases like these, the line
between fraud (on the part of the ineligible voter) and mistake (on the
part of the poll worker) becomes fuzzy.
But, to clarify matters, let us just consider the case of intentional
voter fraud—where someone deliberately adds his vote to the overall
tally, knowing that his vote is illegitimate.  What is the harm here?  I
believe there is harm, but it is only the generic harm of someone
breaking the law without necessarily causing a tangible harm to any-
body.  It is analogous to the case of littering where this does not really
appreciably damage the environment; or parking illegally late at night
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when no one is around.  There is a real harm here: it is a question of
fairness to others, as in the question, why should I have to obey the
law if he can get away with it?  It is also a matter of establishing the
authority of the state: we should not let a person get away with break-
ing the law with impunity.  These are the kinds of feelings and con-
cerns we might have when someone votes illegally.  And I think there
is a perfectly sound remedy to them, and that is to increase the prose-
cution of individual acts of voter fraud, or to raise the penalty for voter
fraud.  These especially target the individual act of wrongdoing.
Of course, if parking illegally was to become a very large problem,
or littering was widespread, more general, prophylactic measures
might be necessary; we might have to restrict parking to certain times
and certain areas, or we might have to limit people’s ability to take
food and drink containers past a certain point (for fear that they might
discard them).  But this is exactly analogous to the case of voting,
where if fraud is massive, then we might be justified in passing laws
that are broad and which would target the problem in a broad-brush
manner.  But in elections where there is no reason to suspect that
there is massive fraud, measures that go after individual acts of fraud
are more likely to be appropriate—because there is no real structural
harm when there is low-level fraud.116
At this point it might be worth pointing out that we can see how
statistics will matter in settling the debate on voter fraud.  We will
want to know if there is massive voter fraud in order to see if the in-
terest in electoral integrity is at stake.  And in some (rare) cases, we
will want to know whether fraud might have determined the outcome
of the election.  So statistics will matter, but we should not be misled
by studies and statistics to somehow misrepresent the interests on ei-
ther side of the “ledger.”  In fact, the interest on the vote dilution side
of the ledger is not an interest that is hurt one “diluted” vote at a time;
it is only hurt in those circumstances where voter fraud may make the
election not one that elects the candidate with the most legitimate
votes.  So there is still a role for studies; however, it is a modest role.
Because once we get a better sense of the interest implicated by voter
fraud, and what sorts of steps the state is justified in taking to combat
the fraud, we see that studies will only be helpful at the margin.
Apart from cases of outcome determinative fraud, the state’s interest
in preventing fraud is the same as its interest in preventing littering
(to this extent, Posner’s analogy is apt): it is a generic interest in
preventing people from unfairly breaking the law.  Posner’s analogy is
116. In addition, when we prosecute individual acts of fraud, we do not risk violat-
ing the participatory rights of others by adopting broad-based measures that might de-
ter voters from voting.
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apt in another way, the decision to spend more resources on prevent-
ing fraud, when this fraud falls short of being massive, should be
looked at as mainly an administrative question and not as a rights
question.
B. THE QUESTION OF UNFAIR BURDENING
Perhaps, however, I have been unfair to Posner’s analogy to litter-
ing.  I concluded, in the last section, that the state’s interest in
preventing voter fraud was similar to its interest in preventing litter-
ing (though certainly one might think the offense of voter fraud is in-
trinsically worse than littering, still the generic interest in preventing
law-breaking is the same).  But Posner says that with crimes that are
hard to detect or underprosecuted, you can do one of two things: you
can increase the penalty, or you can take broad-based measures.  Pos-
ner, that is, says that the difficulty of detecting fraud un-
derdetermines the options for dealing with the fraud. Posner says this
because he feels that the harm that could result from taking a broad-
based measure would be rather minimal.  Again, he bases this (I think
wrongly) on the nature of the plaintiff class.  However, the point still
holds that in the absence of a convincing harm that might result from
a photo identification law, we might say that there is little downside
in taking an overly aggressive step to reduce voter fraud. To be sure,
the state’s interest in preventing minor amounts of voter fraud is
small, but it may have a symbolic importance (again, consider the Pur-
cell Court’s concern for voters’ feelings) and if the interest on the other
side is quite small, what is the problem?
So we should take up the much deferred question of the interest
on the other side of the ledger: the interest of the individual voter who
would vote but for the photo identification requirement.  Posner again
frames this interest as quite small—and revealingly, he reasons that
voters who do not vote because of the new requirements would be vol-
untarily disenfranchising themselves.117  Of course, this is one way to
frame it, and Posner is led to frame it this way most likely because he
feels that the burden placed by a photo requirement is so minimal.  In
his opinion, Posner questions how one could function in ordinary life
without having a photo identification card.  One could not board a
plane, let alone get into many buildings (including a federal court-
room) without some form of photo identification.118  How hard is it to
get one, first of all, and even bracketing the relative ease of getting
117. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated with Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)).
118. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 950-51.
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photo identification, might it be necessary for other parts of life as
well?  Why is it only in voting that it becomes suspicious that photo
identification is required?  If potential voters, given all this, do not get
photo identification or do not bother to bring it to the polls, then there
is not much excuse for them—they have chosen not to vote, they have
not had their vote taken away from them.  They have voluntarily dis-
enfranchised themselves.  It is important to see, then, that Posner not
only has a theory of how many voters might be harmed by new re-
quirements but also about the character of that harm.  Given Posner’s
baseline, the right to vote is only modestly implicated on this side of
the ledger; those who chose not to vote have themselves, and not the
state, to blame.
One of the most common responses to Posner is to say that the
problem with voter identification laws is that the burden of seeking
out and securing photo identification or proof of citizenship will fall
heavily on certain groups—especially  minorities, women and the
poor.  As Judge Diane P. Wood stated pointedly in her dissent to the
denial of rehearing Crawford en banc, “this court should not ignore
this country’s history.  Unfortunately, voting regulations have been
used in the not so-distance past for discriminatory reasons.  The law
challenged in this case will harm an identifiable and often-marginal-
ized group of voters to some undetermined degree.”119  The popular
media reaction to new voter requirements has been even more explicit
than Judge Wood’s dissent.  Such regulations, the charge goes, are ob-
viously racist attempts to prevent minorities, especially black or His-
panic voters, from voting in elections.120  We might even see such
restrictions second coming of the poll tax, another method used to dis-
criminate against and intimidate certain groups of voters.  How
should we consider such charges?  Initially, it may be simply that
charity prevents us from ascribing them to the supporters of such
voter identification laws.  There is at least a colorable argument, the
anti-fraud argument, that can be used to defend such laws.  In other
words, even if racism is the real and sinister motivation behind such
laws, racism may not be the only way such laws can be justified.  If
this is so, then we need to consider the non-racist arguments on their
own terms, because these arguments cannot be defeated through spec-
ulations (however persuasive) about the bad intentions of the sponsors
119. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (consolidated with Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
128 S. Ct. 34 (2007)) (Wood, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., John B. Judis, Can the GOP Convince Blacks Not to Vote?, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 2002 (“The second prong of this year’s GOP efforts to suppress the
minority vote has been widespread allegations of voter fraud in minority
communities.”).
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of such legislations.121  With this caveat in mind, let me make two
main points about the idea that new voter requirements are suspect
because the burden they place falls disproportionately on some
groups.
The first point is about the motivation of legislatures who pass
such legislation.  The standard in these cases is not merely that such
laws will have the effect of disproportionately burdening some groups
(minorities, the poor) but that the laws passed were intended to so
burden some groups rather than others.  This is a high standard, espe-
cially given that (as glossed in the previous paragraph) there is some
case to be made that voter fraud is a problem.  There are questions of
proof that dog any search into legislative intent.122
But there is actually a deeper problem, which is the reverse of
this, it is that we can discern legislative intent in the case of these
laws, and it is often right there on the surface.  The intent is to dis-
criminate, but not necessarily against minorities and women and the
poor qua minorities, women and the poor, but against voters who
would vote Democratic (who happen to be minorities, women, and the
poor).  Judge Evans, dissenting in the original Crawford opinion,
made this point in the opening of his dissent.  “The Indiana voter
photo ID law is a not-too-thinly veiled attempt to discourage election-
day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”123  The
problem with intent—if there is a problem with intent—is not first
and foremost a problem with racist intent, but probably and more
likely with partisan intent.124  This presents a different problem than
the problem of racist intent.
Whatever we think about the propriety of passing laws with parti-
san intent, it seems clear that the wrongness in the case of partisan
intent is less than passing a clearly and intentionally racist or sexist
law.  Partisanship in politics, even in election law politics, is familiar,
and it is (to say the least) debatable whether it can or should be wholly
eliminated.  The Supreme Court’s recent split in Vieth v. Jubiler125
shows not only how difficult it is to set standards on what amount of
partisanship is permissible in setting rules and regulations for elec-
121. Cf. Peter Beinart, Easy Does It, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 2004 (discussing
conservative fears of voter fraud as linked to a philosophy that maintains conservatives
“don’t think higher turnout is necessarily a good thing”).
122. See Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 848-49
(declaring “bad legislative intent is sometimes going to be difficult to prove.  Legislators
will often have an incentive to hide incumbency or party-protecting intent.”).  In his
article, Hasen suggests moving to a test that does not centrally look at intent. Id. at
843-95.
123. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting).
124. I am indebted to Joey Fishkin for discussion on this point.
125. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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tions, but also how difficult it is to identify precisely the wrong of par-
tisanship.126  This is even clearer in the majority opinion in Hunt v.
Cromartie,127 where partisanship is even presented as a possible de-
fense to the charge of racial gerrymandering; it is okay to gerryman-
der, so long as it was done for political and not racial advantage.128  I
do not, by these short remarks, mean to imply that there is no problem
with laws passed with evident partisan attempt, in fact far from it.  I
merely mean that in the case of these laws, where partisan intent is
manifest, it is a much harder thing to prove that such intent is prima
facie legitimate.  Indeed, if we are to stick to the constitutional stan-
dards as the current Court has laid them out, partisan intent is not so
much a problem as an inevitability, and even a defense.
But put these points—which deal with intent, racist, partisan or
otherwise—in the background.  The question of intention is at most a
secondary one; clearly, the first point we would have to deal with in
responding to Posner is to prove that there is a burden at all.  Posner’s
claim, after all, is that no one is burdened by these laws, or if there is a
burden, it is a reasonable one.  A burden that is not a burden is ipso
facto not a burden that is disproportionally placed on any person or
group.  It is just not a burden in the first place, which is exactly what
Posner is claiming about photo identification laws.  What we have,
says Posner, are voters who in the face of a perfectly reasonable re-
striction on the exercise of their right to vote, chose not to vote.  They
decide, in Posner’s colorful recharacterization, to say, “[w]hat the
hell,” and stay home.129  In Posner’s estimation, they are not bur-
dened.  Therefore laws that pass these reasonable requirements are
not discriminatory burdens, because they are not burdens at all.
What we need to do is to take a step back.  Before we show or
presume that the laws are discriminatory, in that they evidence racist,
sexist, or partisan intent, we need to show that the laws are in fact
burdens.  This means abstracting, for the moment, from the question
of which group the laws burden; it means stepping back and asking, in
what ways do these laws burden the right to participation more gener-
ally?  Only after we show this (if we can show it), can we look to see
whether the burden is heavier on some particular groups rather than
126. Vieth v.  Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004).
127. 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
128. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) (declaring “a jurisdiction may en-
gage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal
Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that
fact”).  Could not an analogous point be made about efforts to reduce voter fraud?
129. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951 (“So some people who have not bothered to obtain a
photo ID will not bother to do so just to be allowed to vote, and a few who have a photo
ID but forget to bring it to the polling place will say forget it and not vote, rather than go
home and get the ID and return to the polling place.”).
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others, and hence is not merely a burdensome law, but also a discrimi-
natory one.  It is this question of establishing the burden of new voting
requirements, such as photo identification, that occupies me in the
next sections of this Part.  It leads, I think, quite naturally, into a
larger discussion of why participation is a value, that is to say, why
participation that is not unreasonably burdensome is a goal we should
try to achieve.
C. SETTING THE BASELINE FOR VOTER DETERRENCE
If we turn from particular groups of voters to voters in general,
the problem can be characterized as one of choosing the right baseline:
we need to set the baseline against which we measure efforts to make
it easier or harder for voters to actually vote.  So we might start with
the baseline of expecting voters to have photo identification available
and ready to present at the polls.  With this baseline, a photo identifi-
cation requirement might not seem all that unreasonable, because our
governing expectation is that voters should have their identification
ready.  But we can imagine a different baseline which says that the
state should not require voters to have photo identification.  Here, re-
quiring photo identification is presumptively unreasonable, because
what we expect of voters is that they only have registered to vote in
time for the election, whether or not they bring photo identification
with them to their polling places on election day.  Deciding whether a
certain requirement is unreasonable depends on which baseline we
start out with, because that baseline will tell what is reasonable or
unreasonable to expect of voters.
How do we go about choosing the right baseline?  One way of ana-
lyzing this question is to simply look at the costs of not having those
additional obstacles.  If the argument of the first section was persua-
sive, then the cost is not very great to the legitimacy of the election if
there is some fraud of the sort new photo identification laws are de-
signed to prevent.  By contrast, if even some voters are deterred from
voting because of new regulations we might think that this is some-
thing bad, depending on how highly we value widespread participa-
tion in an election.  Spencer Overton, as I alluded to in the first Part of
my Essay, has already defended the value of widespread participation.
Indeed, Overton makes a good case that electoral legitimacy consists
of having as many people as are eligible (under reasonable qualifica-
tion standards) vote.130  So we might say, in this regard, that “electo-
ral integrity lies on both sides of the equation”—though we should add
that in fact that each increase in participation does increase incre-
130. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 657-58 (2007).
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mentally the legitimacy of the election.  As I have tried to show, this is
not the case with fraud, where only massive fraud (or outcome deter-
minative fraud) should make us question the legitimacy of the elec-
tion; illegitimacy in terms of vote dilution due to fraud is not scalar,
that is, it does not increase as fraud increases.
But as I sketch in the next section, the structural interest—the
interest in legitimacy in terms of securing widespread participation—
is not the only, and indeed not the primary value that is at stake with
new voter identification laws.  There is the basic value of individual
participation, and it is using this metric that we have to fix the base-
line.  Should we try and have the greatest participation possible?  If
we had this as our baseline, it might be too lax, because then we would
have no regulations at all regarding registration and might simply
take it on voters’ own honor that they were citizens, of voting age, etc.
Certainly the state might have some interest in preventing this, be-
cause if we had no restrictions on voting, the risk of massive fraud
would be too high.  On the other side, we might have a baseline of no
voter fraud.  This, however, has its own problems, not only in terms of
the resources it would take, but also in terms of the fear that it might
deter many voters and also cause some voters to be rejected acciden-
tally.  It seems clear that the baseline should be fixed somewhere in
between these two extremes—both so that we would not have just an-
yone voting, nor would we have requirements that were so draconian
that the requirements ended up causing a large decrease in turnout.
How does a new requirement for photo identification, such as the ones
at issue in the Purcell and Crawford cases, fit along this spectrum?
There seem to be at least three types of voters that might have their
participation limited or reduced by such a law, only one type, I think,
has a truly legitimate complaint—one that we should be concerned
about when passing new laws that place new restrictions on the right
to vote.
The first group is those identified by the Purcell Court.  These are
those voters who might be accidentally denied the ability to vote based
on the misunderstanding of polling place workers.131  The Court ap-
pears to take it as a given that with any new law passed, there will be
errors in application and that the state is responsible for these in some
sense.  However, there are two things we should note about this
group.  On the one hand, this group is in fact seriously wronged: they
have their ability to vote taken away from them by poll workers who
131. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (per curiam) (“Although the likely
effects of Proposition 200 are much debated, the possibility that qualified voters might
be turned away from the polls would caution any district judge to give careful considera-
tion to the plaintiffs’ challenges.”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRE\41-1\CRE104.txt unknown Seq: 51 24-MAR-08 11:29
2007] VOTER FRAUD 143
mistakenly think that they should not vote.  But by hypothesis, these
voters did have the right identification.  Here, the wrong can seem
rather serious to the individual voters who suffer this exclusion.  They
have been blocked from exercising their right to vote even though they
were qualified under the new laws and requirements.  On the other
hand, it is not obvious—and the Court does not really provide much
support for its assumption here—that the state really should be re-
sponsible for the voter not being able to vote.  If the exclusion was
intentional, then the Court is right that this is a real problem.
We have no reason to think that it is intentional, however.  And if
the exclusion was merely the result of a poll worker’s innocent mis-
take, then while this is unfortunate, this probably does not represent
that serious of a harm.  What is surprising in all this is how aggres-
sive the Court seems to be in encouraging widespread participation, so
much so that the Court ascribes even the possibility of mistake to the
state, as if the state should be responsible for mistakes made in ad-
ministering a law in the same way that it should be worried about
discriminatory treatment of voters at polling places.  In the end, I
think that this ascription of responsibility is a stretch.  The state
should try to limit the number of people excluded in this way; how-
ever, in exactly the same way, the state should try to minimize the
number of tabulation errors.
If those who are mistakenly rejected did have all the identifica-
tion they needed, we might see a group at the other extreme who did
not have the new identification and who know that this is needed, but
who do not bother to get it.  This seems to be the group of people that
Posner targeted in the Crawford opinion; indeed, he seems to believe
that these are the only people who are at stake on the other side of the
ledger.  These are the people who say “what the hell” and do not
bother to take the reasonable steps to get photo identification.  Specifi-
cally, these are the people that Posner claims have disenfranchised
themselves.  Do these people have a legitimate complaint that they
have been disenfranchised, that they have been denied the right to
participate?  It seems that this complaint would be weak, at best.
Those who choose not to take steps to get the right documents, when
they have the time and opportunity, have chosen not to vote.  Again,
the baseline should not be set so that everyone should be able to par-
ticipate at no cost to them (although perhaps an argument can be
made to this effect132).  The idea is that for these people, the new re-
132. Although one might imagine making voting compulsory, so that the baseline
would then be that all should participate–because all must. See Note, The Case for
Compulsory Voting in the United States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591 (2007).  I am grateful to
Bruce Ackerman for pressing me on this point.
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quirements can be complied with at little cost, and yet this group of
voters does not comply with them.  If we accept this hypothesis for this
group of voters, their participatory interest is small.  Indeed, they are
exercising their right not to participate in an election, a right which is
guaranteed in all systems where participation in an election is not
compulsory.
But there is another group between those who have the identifica-
tion but poll workers mistakenly deny them the right to vote, and
those who do not have the identification and who do not bother to take
the reasonable steps necessary to obtain proper identification.  That
third group consists of those who reasonably cannot get the necessary
identification and who but for that additional identification are unable
to vote.  So consider a member of this group who is a citizen, who is
registered to vote, but is unable to vote in the next election because
the individual either has reasonably been unaware of the new require-
ments or is aware of the requirements but cannot get the necessary
identification in time (due to bureaucratic delays, etc.).  We might im-
agine even that this person is turned away legitimately from the polls
and not due to a mistake.  But we might still think that this person
has been disenfranchised, for this person by hypothesis had all the
right underlying qualifications to be able to vote, but simply lacked
one piece of identification that had as its function merely to confirm
the fact that the person was qualified to vote.  In Edward Still’s nice
phrase, this person is an “undocumented citizen”—a citizen who is eli-
gible to vote but for the lack of correct document or documents.133
Such a person is different, I think, than a member of the class that
Judge Posner identified.  For his use of the idea that some people vol-
untarily disenfranchise themselves does not contemplate those who do
not wish to be unable to vote, and who are reasonably unaware of the
new requirements, or reasonably cannot comply with them (even
though, again, they would be qualified but for the missing document).
The people in this final group do seem to have a participatory right
that is being denied and which the state should consider when it
passes new laws that put additional requirements on a person’s ability
to vote.
Here again, however, we should return to the question that in
some form or another has structured this Essay: will it not be impor-
tant to know how many voters will be affected in this way, that is, how
many there are of the type that is reasonably justified in not having
133. See, e.g., THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, CITIZENS
WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITI-
ZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION, VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTIONS SERIES 3 (2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39242.pdf (noting that
millions of American citizens lack ready access to “documentary proof of citizenship”).
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the required photo identification?  The answer to this is that, of
course, it will be helpful.  But we need to remind ourselves of the con-
cerns in Part II.  It will be difficult to discover those who are members
of the class of voters who had the underlying qualifications, but not
only did not have the photo identification but could not have reasona-
bly been expected to, given what they knew about the new law and
what they were able to do in response to it.  Moreover, as I argue in
the next section, it is not clear that we will need the statistical infor-
mation (such as we are able to acquire) if we know what values are at
stake on “each side of the ledger.”  So this points to an additional rea-
son why we might not need statistics; not only may statistics be hard
to acquire, once we understand the values at stake, numbers may be
irrelevant.  That is, it could be that understanding the low value in
deterring low levels of fraud and the high value we might assign to
participation and importantly each person’s ability to participate, it
may be easy to decide the question about voter fraud.  I expand upon
why we should rate this value highly in the concluding Parts of my
Essay.  It is here where I make my main practical contribution, which
is that analyzing voter fraud cases simply as matters of individual
rights (specifically, the individual right to cast a ballot) should be the
preferred way for courts to approach voter fraud.  If courts follow this
path, courts will largely be spared having to interpret statistics or
make theoretical arguments about the proper structure of a
democracy.
D. THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION
In Part II of this Essay, I argued that statistics may not be deci-
sive in voter fraud cases.  That is, it may not be enough to say that
there are only small amounts of fraud, or few voters are actually de-
terred from the polls because of new voter registration or identifica-
tion requirements.  We have to look at the values involved on each
side.  In Part III, I tried to show how courts, in discussing voter fraud,
would use terms and concepts from the scholarship surrounding the
law of democracy, such as structural values like corruption and vote
dilution when talking about the state’s interest in regulating the vote.
Finally, in this Part, I have argued that when we look at the values
involved, there is a strong case to be made against additional restric-
tions on the right to vote.  The upshot of the discussion in this section
so far is that we can analyze the voter fraud cases pretty comprehen-
sively without relying on statistics.  To be sure, statistics will be help-
ful, but only at the margins—only when there is fraud (or mistake) to
the extent that there is a real question whether the election has re-
sulted in the selection of the person with the most legitimate votes.  In
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other words, statistics may be important only in rare cases, and in the
absence of good statistics, we do not have to use bad statistics, but
instead perhaps simply be more clear in our normative argumenta-
tion.  When we are clear, we see the interest in vote dilution to be
rather minimal, and the interest in participation perhaps much
larger.  Importantly, when an individual is denied his or her right to
participate in the vote and this is either deliberate or foreseeable by
the state, this is a real harm.  Moreover, it is a real harm even if it
happens to one person.  For that one person, the denial of the right to
vote is total.  By comparison, if one person’s vote is diluted, that is a
relatively minor harm for the individual (recall that the goal of an un-
diluted vote only makes sense when votes are aggregated).  In the case
of voter fraud, I do not think it is a harm at all, because the relative
group that would benefit from being able to aggregate its votes—legit-
imate voters—only has an overall interest in a legitimate election.
But as I have tried to urge, this interest is implicated only in cases of
massive fraud.  It is the same interest in having no major tabulation
errors in an election contest, and this, I have argued, is really no inter-
est at all.
The lesson we can draw from this is that structural concerns
should be secondary to the value of participation in the debate over
voter fraud.  Corruption is an important concern with voter fraud only
in cases of massive fraud; or, if we are tying corruption simply with
law breaking, then corruption is implicated in voter fraud only in the
same way that it is implicated in every instance of law breaking for
personal gain.  Vote dilution, the concept that both the Purcell Court
and Judge Posner appeal to, is singularly inapposite here.  It is not
that they misapply the concept, it is just that the concept needs some
group that is inappropriately harmed by that dilution to fix on.  The
fact of the matter is that we can always see vote dilution.  Even in a
legitimate election, the losers have their votes reduced in impact by
the votes of the winners; they are unable to aggregate their votes ef-
fectively in some sense because there are not enough voters for the
losing candidate to turn the losing candidate into the winning candi-
date.  But “the losing voters” in an election is not a relevant group that
we should be concerned about.  Nor is there a group called “legitimate
voters” that has its interests harmed whenever a fraudulent vote is
cast.  It does not make real sense to consider promoting their interest
in a legitimate election, unless this means in the rule of law sense, or
in the sense that they should want an election where the outcome is
determined by legitimate votes.  But in this latter case, their only real
concern is avoiding massive voter fraud, not with the incremental
harm that is caused by having one’s legitimate vote diluted by an ille-
gitimate voter.  This I do not think is a real harm at all, at least not in
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the way that it might be plausible to say that it is a bad thing each
time a minority vote is diluted by racial gerrymandering.  Here, it
does seem that there is a harm that might be incremental; it may be
bad each time we reduce the effectiveness of a minority vote, even if
that incremental decrease in effectiveness does not mean that the mi-
nority is any less likely to elect a candidate of choice.
In fact, the key value in the voter fraud cases is participation.134
Participation, simply put, is the value of being able to cast one’s own
ballot, free from intimidation and unnecessary restrictions and to
have that vote counted.  Let me briefly make two points to highlight
the value of participation and its meaning.  The first is that although
the right to vote is often pressed by groups (women, blacks, etc.), the
right in question is not a right of discrete groups.  It is not the right of
a group collectively to elect its favored candidate or to vote in a bloc.
Rather, in the end it is only a right of the individual to cast a ballot.  If
some coalitions emerge after the vote is cast (for example, most Afri-
can Americans vote for the Democratic candidate) this is only a contin-
gent result of people individually voting; it is not constitutive of their
right to vote.  In other words, when considered as a right to partici-
pate, groups may start movements in order to have the right to par-
ticipate, but once this right is granted that right must be taken one
person at a time, and does not depend on membership in any group.
We do not have the right to cast a ballot qua women or blacks or any
other group.  We have it qua American citizens.
The second thing to note is that, from another angle, the right to
vote has a value even if one’s individual vote is not outcome determi-
native.  From this perspective, one can see voting as perhaps the most
significant symbol of citizenship.  The fact that blacks and women and
those old enough to serve in the military can vote indicates that they
are full members of American society.  As Bruce Ackerman puts it,
“voting is the paradigmatic form of universal citizenship.”135  There is
no group smaller than this “universal” group that the individual right
to participate in an election endorses, except again only contingently,
as a result of groups clustering together to favor particular candidates
based on their shared interests or identity.  Because this value of vot-
ing, viz., its affirmation of our participation in a common venture, is
134. By invoking participation, I mean to contrast it with the values of aggregation
and governance. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism about For-
malism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1711-13 (1993) (analyzing various aspects of the right to
vote).  A full defense of the value of participation is beyond the scope of this essay.  For a
more complete defense, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 63-104 (1998) (emphasizing the participatory aspect of voting).  My point
here is simply to highlight its centrality in cases of voter fraud.
135. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE 239 (1991).
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largely a symbolic and expressive one, it is a value that is generally
independent of whether the result of the election is one that we hoped
for.  So we would mistake the nature of the right to vote if we mea-
sured it solely in terms of its impact.  Even when we lose, we are still
part of the process and not excluded from it.  And the benefit here is
not “elusive,” as Posner somewhat dismissively says, but is in fact
quite tangible.136  We would only hold it as intangible if we thought
that the only possible reason we would vote is to get the benefit of
having our favored candidate elected.  But this is not, at least not en-
tirely, what those who fought for the right to vote were fighting for.
They were fighting for the right to participate and influence the pro-
cess and not to decisively shape the outcome of an election every time.
They were fighting for the very real recognition that being able to par-
ticipate in the political process confers on an individual.  To state this
point is perhaps obvious, but it is important to be clear about it; it is
similar to the point that there is value to playing the game with
others, even if one loses.
Of course, on the other side, the state has an interest in securing
the right to vote only for those who are qualified to do so.  This means
that some who want to participate in an election will not be able to do
so because they are not citizens, or because they lack the requisite
proof of their citizenship.  But the state should not set restrictions and
requirements in a way that unfairly denies those who have the under-
lying qualifications the right to vote, that is, to participate.  This in-
cludes especially the members of the class I discussed in the last
section, who are basically undocumented citizens.  When they are de-
nied the right to vote, they are disenfranchised, and even though the
number of voters in this situation may be small, it is important to see
that it is a harm to each and every one of them when their vote is
denied.  This is not a structural value, either, it is an individual value
which is why we can measure it one by one, rather than having to look
at voters in the aggregate.  We do not, that is, have to see whether
their vote would be decisive, or whether it would have greater influ-
ence when added to the votes of the other members of the group.
Their harm is one that we know is a real harm regardless of whether
the vote would have influenced the election one way or the other.  This
makes it easier to see, not in the sense of being easier to measure
(again, statistics in this case will be hard to come by), but by seeing
136. Cf. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951 (stating that “[t]he benefits of voting to the indi-
vidual voter are elusive (a vote in a political election rarely has any instrumental value,
since elections for political office at the state or federal level are never decided by just
one vote)”).
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how it is a person who may be harmed by having the person’s right to
vote denied.
The person is harmed simply by not being able to cast a ballot—
not the ability to cast a meaningful or effective ballot, but purely by
not being able to cast a ballot.  Spencer Overton realizes this early on
in his essay on voter fraud, but then stresses later on in his essay how
poor and minority votes might be diluted by new restrictions on voter
fraud.137  But by putting so much stress on dilution, I believe Overton
is mistaking a more remote harm for the more direct harm.  The direct
harm is an interference with the right of poor and minority voters to
participate.  Of course, if they cannot participate, they cannot aggre-
gate their votes with other like-minded citizens.  But we should put
first things first: the first problem is that laws imposing new restric-
tions will prevent them from voting, and you cannot aggregate your
vote if you cannot vote.  Denial of participation affects you irrespective
of your class, or your race.
All of this is not to say that structural values are irrelevant.  Cer-
tainly not.  But just in the same way that a focus on individual values
can obscure the structural values at stake—we may think that all we
need to do is done when we have guaranteed the individual his right
to cast a ballot—a focus on structural values may shift our angle of
vision away from the individual’s right.  In fact, it is just that focus
that helps us best get a grip on what is at stake in voter fraud cases
and how to analyze them.  It is not that we need more statistics, or
more structural analysis.  In fact, it is arguable that this is where both
courts went wrong—either in using statistics in a way that obscured
the values at stake, or using the wrong level of analysis by looking at
how voter fraud might affect the integrity of an election.  What we
need in these cases is perhaps a more basic level of analysis, one that
focuses on the ability to be able to participate in an election which is
the most necessary aspect of the right to vote and the most
indispensable.
E. A NOTE ON JUDICIAL COMPETENCE
The main reason for focusing on participation in cases that test
the constitutionality of new voter regulations is that it simply is the
salient value.  The interest in the state preventing fraud is minor, or
better remedied by a focus on increasing prosecutions (which does not
have the tradeoff of deterring voters from the polls).  But it also pays
137. Overton, supra note 130, at 673-74 (“Despite the emphasis on individual re-
sponsibility, photo-identification requirements that exclude legitimate voters dilute the
political choices of not only those who are unable to produce photo identification but also
their allies who do produce a photo-identification card.”).
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to emphasize that participation considered as a value fits in well with
ordinary understandings of judicial competence.  Consider first that if
we look simply at participation, we are not worried—at least not as
much as in the case of vote dilution—about how much participation is
being prevented.  If we find state action that prevents otherwise quali-
fied voters from voting, that obstructs a citizen’s interest in participat-
ing, then we have a serious harm, even if there is only one person who
is prevented from casting a ballot.  A poll tax, for instance, does not
become less of a constitutional problem if the poll tax prevents only
one person (or some small class of persons) from voting.  This is how
the value of participation differs from the value of an undiluted vote.
Again, looking at dilution means looking at how individuals are able
to aggregate their votes as members of a group.  It follows that mea-
suring how much a person’s vote is diluted will involve seeing to what
extent voters are able to join with others in aggregating their votes.
Numbers matter here much more than they do in the participation
case.
Participation is, by contrast, an individual interest and it is harm
to the individual each time an additional restriction is placed on an
individual’s right to vote, past those restrictions that are necessary to
prevent massive fraud.  And for the voter who does not vote, it is a
harm that hits the voter all at once.  The voter is not harmed incre-
mentally, as in the case of vote dilution.  So we might believe that
courts will be better at looking at whether the individual’s rights are
being burdened, as compared with looking at an individual’s right in
concert with others (in the case of minority vote dilution, for instance).
If we focus on the participation interest, we might be less worried
about adding up instances of fraud and instances of deterrence and
then comparing them.  We might, instead, simply focus on whether
the participatory right is being burdened because (again) this matters,
even in a single case of a voter who does not vote, who is not able to
participate
Relatedly, a focus on participation as an individual interest
means that the court does not have to deal directly with questions of
democratic structure.138  Participation, of course, is one element of de-
mocracy, and it is a vital one, even a foundational one.  So if we are
talking about the structure of a functioning democracy, we are going
to talk in terms of participation and maximizing participation.  But
the ideal at least is that once we have secured the conditions of maxi-
138. Cf. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601,
604 (2007) (discussing the distinction between “individualists” and “structuralists” in
election law).  In siding with those Charles terms the “individualists,” I hasten to add
that it is solely in the case of voter fraud that I find the individualist analysis most
persuasive.
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mum participation, we can leave the decisions regarding what sort of
democratic structure to have to the people.139  Democracy is in a way
radical at its core; it demands that, absent a compelling justification,
people make the most of the decisions, even decisions about demo-
cratic structure.140  Again, this is the ideal.  It will not always be the
case that more participation will yield more democratic outcomes, be-
cause there may be systematic problems that prevent participation
from yielding reform.  Parties may be entrenched, for instance, or
there may be racial polarization.  We cannot entirely leave matters to
participation alone, and sometimes reforms will have to come from
above and not from below.141
There may be some areas, however, and I think voter fraud is one
of them, where participation is really the main value that we need to
focus on, and matters of structure can be safely abstracted from.
Courts do not need to develop a well-worked out theory of democracy
in order to say that participation is essential to democracy.  The only
real ‘structural’ interest at stake in voter fraud cases is avoiding an
election that is decided by illegitimate votes, an interest that will only
be at play in very rare cases.  Other than this, the chief role of courts
in voter fraud cases is to guard the possibility of participation by the
widest number of citizens that is consistent with preventing massive
levels of fraud.  This is not an easy role, but it is certainly a more
tractable one than measuring vote dilution, or deciding on the deep
meaning of electoral integrity.  Additionally, it is a role courts are bet-
ter suited to fill, as opposed to making larger, structural reforms.  Al-
though I think in some areas of law a focus on structure is inevitable
and necessary, this is not the case with voter fraud. Therefore, no mat-
ter our position on the law of democracy in general, here, in this case,
we might rightly settle for a more constrained role for courts.
The current standard for courts in deciding how much the state
can burden the right to vote is the “flexible” standard announced in
Burdick v. Takushi,142 so let me make some very brief remarks on
how my conclusions apply given this standard.  On the one hand, the
Court said in Burdick that the state should not have to submit every
proposed change in voting regulations to strict scrutiny.  To do so, the
139. I take this to be one of the motivations behind Thomas’ concurrence in Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring).
140. Consider, in this instance, Justice Stevens’ claim in Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 (2000) (Stevens, J. dissenting), stating “It is not this Court’s
constitutional function to choose between the competing visions of what makes democ-
racy work.” Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
141. See Chad Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from
the Perspective of Election Law, 23 J. L. & POL. 147 (2007) (arguing for the proper role of
the Supreme Court in election law).
142. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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Court reasoned, would be to “tie the hands of States seeking to assure
that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”143  But this does
not mean, on the other hand, that every regulation that the state pro-
poses gets a free pass so long as it can be plausibly connected to the
equitable and efficient running of elections.  Rather, the state has to
show, and show “precise[ly],” “the extent to which its interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”144  In the above sections, I
have tried to demonstrate that the state does have some fairly precise
interests at play, viz., an interest in not having people disobey the law
by engaging in fraud, and also an interest in avoiding an election
where the outcome is determined by fraudulent votes.  The former in-
terest is a minor and generic one, as well as an interest that is better
secured by increasing the penalties for voter fraud.
The second interest is an interest that most obviously comes into
play where we suspect that there has been massive fraud, fraud that
makes it likely that the election has been illegitimate or that may
make voters suspect that the wrong candidate has been elected.  The
interest here is real, but it is an open question whether additional reg-
ulations (such as requiring photo identification) will really be needed
to avoid fraud of this size, or whether such fraud is better deterred in
other ways.  The state would have to make a pretty good case that its
new regulations are designed to prevent (and would prevent) such out-
come determinative fraud, rather than just preventing the occasional,
random fraudulent vote or two.  Courts will have to weigh how persua-
sively the state has proven the possibility of massive or outcome deter-
minative fraud against the interests of voters who might be prevented
from voting.  That is, courts will have to see whether the state can
demonstrate that it needs new requirements on voting to stop massive
fraud, and whether this demonstration is persuasive enough to justify
a foreseeable deterrence of some voters from voting.
Accordingly, courts should cast a skeptical eye on regulations that
are too broad and aggressive for the problems just identified; such reg-
ulations swat flies with a hammer as one dissenting judge in Craw-
ford put it.145  The state’s interest is not that great: fraud is only bad
and only becomes a real problem when it is at the level where it will
affect the outcome of an election, thus affecting whether an election
can function as an election.  The interest of participation by voters
who have the underlying qualifications to vote but lack the necessary
identification, however, is great, and it is one that is at risk every time
143. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
144. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 798
(1983); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986)).
145. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Is it wise to use a
sledgehammer to hit either a real or imaginary fly on a glass coffee table?  I think not.”).
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an additional voter is prevented from voting by new and unnecessary
regulations.  When balanced against the state’s interest in preventing
fraud and the fear of fraud, the participatory interest should usually
win.146
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay runs against current election law scholarship in two
respects.  It has challenged the relevance and usefulness of gathering
more data on voter fraud.  In addition, it has suggested that the best
lens with which to analyze voter fraud and voter deterrence is not
structural, but in fact individual.  In both of these respects, this Essay
might be considered rather ambitious, even overambitious.  But in
fact, my ambitions have been rather narrow and apply only narrowly.
Indeed, I do not claim that my analysis extends beyond the contexts of
voter fraud and voter deterrence.  Nor do I differ greatly from those
who are suspicious of laws mandating new restrictions on the ability
to vote; I merely give them an alternative framework within which to
conceptualize their no doubt warranted suspicion that such laws are
disproportionate to the harms involved.
146. Is it also a bad thing when voter tabulation errors mean that someone’s vote is
not counted?  Yes, and possibly in the same way.  When corrections to the voter tabula-
tion can be made at little or no cost, then the legislature is culpable for causing some
votes not to be counted, a harm they could have foreseen.  In a similar way, a legisla-
ture, when enacting unnecessary new voter requirements is likewise culpable for caus-
ing some persons to not be able to vote (again, a harm which they could have foreseen).
However, one might distinguish the harms in this way: with a tabulation error, no voter
gets turned away, nor does the voter know for sure that his or her vote has not been
counted.  When a voter is turned away because the voter lacks identification, the voter
knows that its vote will not be counted.  I am indebted to David Pozen and Will Baude
for discussion on this question.
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